Re: [PATCH] SE-PostgreSQL Security Policy

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Kohei KaiGai wrote:
The attached patch provides security policies related to SE-PostgreSQL.

The followings are updates/unchanges from the previous version submitted
at two weeks ago. These updates replaced most of the part in the previous
one.

- The targets of this patch are moved to services/postgresql.*,
  although the previous one added new entries.
- Any interface got slim. They contains only one TYPEATTRIBUTE
  statement, and postgresql.te allows most of permissions to
  the associated attributes.
* Tunables to turn on/off audit are remained now, because database
  folks told me fine-grained logs are worthwhile feature.

Any comment please,

Thanks,

Chris,

What is the current status of the patch?

Just like with the X server, I don't believe that sepostgres should have
its own module.

OK, I'll make next one as a patch for services/postgresql.*.

At first glance, there appears to be too many
attributes.  I'm guessing that you're doing the same thing that is done
with the *_unconfined() interfaces.  We mainly do that to optimize size
since unconfined brings in so many rules.

OK, I'll replace current interfaces by the following style's one.

interface(`sepostgresql_unconfined',`
        gen_require(`
                attribute sepostgresql_unconfined_type;
        ')
        typeattribute $1 sepostgresql_unconfined_type;
')

I also see references to types and attributes that belong do the module.

Is it unlabel_t and system_r?
Where is the best place to associate them with my local policy?

 > Also the auditing
tunables seem unneeded; they seem to be more for debugging use.  I think
I can get a better handle on the policy with these revisions.

Hmm...
The reason why I added these tunables is that database folks told me
that collecting logs in column/tuple level is an attractive feature,
because native DBMS cannot provide fine-grained access control and
cannot collect logs in these level.
Thus, I believe the feature to turn on/off auditing readily should
be remained.

Thanks,




--
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

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