On Mon, 2008-02-25 at 15:11 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> Bill Chimiak wrote:
> > 3. Are any of these potentially dangerous (my apologies if this is a stupid
> > request)?
> > allow fsdaemon_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
> fsdaemon reading /dev/urandom - Not dangerous
Right, not dangerous. Generally it could only be a problem if you were
concerned about the domain draining all of the entropy in order to DoS
apps that use /dev/random.
> > allow groupadd_t devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
> groupadd read/write of a generice pty. Not dangerous, since what
> groupadd can do is far more dangerous.
[...]
> > allow semanage_t devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
> > allow setfiles_t devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
> > allow useradd_t devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
> All three of these are trying to read/write pty that has generic label.
> Nothing to worry about since these domains can do much more interesting
> damage.
That's true if you look at as the domain doing malicious things to the
terminal. Another way to look at it would be that these privileged
domains could be influenced by malicious data they read from a user's
terminal. So if you don't care about the latter than its not a problem.
If you're running all unconfined users, then you trust the users and it
definitely isn't a problem.
--
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
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