RE: Q: SECMARK controls on forwarded packets

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These controls look good to us... 

-Chad

> 
> On Wednesday 09 January 2008 9:04:43 am James Morris wrote:
> > It'd be interesting to see what some fully worked network policy
> > would look like ...
> 
> Everything below is based on the patches found here (the very 
> observant 
> will notice slight differences in permission ordering from previous 
> mailing list patch postings):
> 
>  * http://git.infradead.org/?p=users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_testing
> 
> The following is an example of what permissions are needed for the 
> various send/receive/forward network tasks using the "new and 
> improved" 
> network controls.  In addition, while policy is not ordered, I've 
> ordered the allow rules in the order in which the kernel performs the 
> access checks.  I've also left out the labeled IPsec SA 
> polmatch checks 
> since those are unchanged and add some noise to the rules below.
> 
> If anyone has any comments/problems/objections please speak 
> up quickly 
> so we can get everything straightened out as soon as possible.
> 
>  - basic subj/obj definitions
> 
>    socket_t  = socket's label
>    peer_t    = peer label as determined by NetLabel and/or 
> labeled IPsec
>    secmark_t = secmark/iptables label
>    netif_t   = network interface label
>    node_t    = network address label
> 
>  - inbound locally consumed traffic permissions
> 
>    # is TOP_SECRET traffic allowed on this network?
>    allow peer_t netif_t:netif ingress;
>    allow peer_t node_t:node recvfrom;
>    # is apache allowed to receive traffic from firefox?
>    allow socket_t peer_t:peer recv;
>    # is apache allowed to receive web traffic?
>    allow socket_t secmark_t:packet recv;
> 
>  - outbound locally generated traffic permissions
>    
>    # is apache allowed to send web traffic?
>    allow socket_t secmark_t:packet send;
>    # is TOP_SECRET traffic allowed on this network?
>    allow socket_t netif_t:netif egress;
>    allow socket_t node_t:node sendto;
> 
>  - inbound forwaded traffic permissions
> 
>    # is TOP_SECRET traffic allowed on this network?   
>    allow peer_t netif_t:netif ingress;
>    allow peer_t node_t:node recvfrom;
>    # is apache allowed to forward web traffic through this system?
>    allow peer_t secmark_t:packet forward_in;
> 
>  - outbound forwarded traffic permissions
> 
>    # is apache allowed to forward web traffic through this system?
>    allow peer_t secmark_t:packet forward_out;
>    # is TOP_SECRET traffic allowed on this network?
>    allow peer_t netif_t:netif egress;
>    allow peer_t node_t:node sendto;
> 
> -- 
> paul moore
> linux security @ hp
> 


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