Re: [PATCH 3/3] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote:

> On Sat, 2007-11-17 at 08:47 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote:
> > 
> > > On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
> > > security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
> > > lower than mmap_min_addr.
> > 
> > Actually, should we be doing any checking in the dummy module, given that 
> > it is not done with !CONFIG_SECURITY ?
> 
> I'm not sure I understand the question.  We already do a number of
> capable type security checks in dummy functions. See dummy_settime() as
> just one example.

I mean just in this case.  If no mmap_min_addr check is done without 
CONFIG_SECURITY, then perhaps none should be done in the dummy module, 
i.e. preserving existing behavior.  LSM is theoretically supposed to be 
unnoticable from a behavioral pov unless a non-dummy module is loaded.

> 
> If we have !CONFIG_SECURITY we don't have any security protections (how
> could we?  we turned them off) so we don't get into dummy hooks.  If we
> do checks or not in uncompiled code doesn't seem to me to matter.
> 
> Maybe I'm just confused...
> 
> -Eric
> 

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux