Re: [RFC PATCH v6 05/13] SELinux: add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook

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--- Paul Moore <paul.moore@xxxxxx> wrote:

> On Friday 09 November 2007 5:19:02 pm Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > --- Paul Moore <paul.moore@xxxxxx> wrote:
> > > Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
> > > secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.
> >
> > I'll bite. Where does this get used?
> 
> Patch 12/13, functions netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() and 
> netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef().  It is used to convert a user supplied label 
> into a token which is later passed to the LSM; in the SELinux case it is used
> 
> directly in an avc_has_perm() call.
> 
> Go ahead and check, I'll wait ... just please don't bring up the whole 
> getpeercon() issue (essentially the example you chose, although you picked 
> the connectionless version) again.  Worrying about something that typically 
> happens only once (if at all) per-connection is not something I want to worry
> 
> about optimizing if it causes the per-packet case to become more tedious.
> 
> > There. I got the righteous indignation off my chest. I say to
> > go ahead with adding this to the LSM ... {snip}
> 
> Sigh.  I agree, the whole tokenized label concept is conceptually very 
> annoying and I'll also agree that it can be frustrating for certain 
> implementations.  However, the world we live in (the Linux kernel) makes use 
> of these tokenized labels (secid, SID, etc) because it's all the original LSM
> 
> folks could get in some places.  The fact that this works fine with SELinux 
> (actually works better than fine in some cases) is a happy coincidence and 
> probably the reason things haven't changed much.
> 
> I _really_ don't want to get into the "one true security model" debate, but 
> the fact remains that as long as SELinux is the only LSM implementation in 
> the mainline kernel there is no reason to change this.  If/when SMACK (this 
> is really the immediate source of the "righteous indignation" after all, 
> right?) is merged then it will probably make sense to go revisit some of 
> those earlier decisions regarding these tokenized labels.  For me personally,
> 
> right now I'm just concerned about making sure the labeled networking bits 
> work as well as we can make them work; with SELinux that means using a 
> secid/SID to speed up the per-packet access checks.  For SMACK, this will 
> probably mean passing the actual string label.  You and I have already talked
> 
> about this so _you_know_ there is a SMACK friendly solution to the 
> fallback/static label functionality; I just can't justify adding code that 
> serves no purpose in the context (haha!) of the current kernel sources.
> 
> You know all this Casey, so I have no idea where all of these comments are 
> coming from - bad day at work?  Somebody run over your dog?  Well, go home, 
> have a beer and forget about it for right now.  Get SMACK merged, or any 
> other LSM which highlights the same problem, and we can put that "righteous 
> indignation" to good use; right now, it's just plan tiresome.
> 
> > In Linux 2.7 I propose that we fix these problems. Not today.
> 
> Un huh ... in the meantime I'm gonna work with what I have :)

Sounds like a plan with merit. I would not expect a change to existing
code without a good^H^H^H^Hbetter alternative proposed. As I don't
have such in hand at the moment, I agree that the current scheme is
pragmatic. And yes, I'm still working on getting Smack in.



Casey Schaufler
casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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