RE: security context for SPD entries of labeled IPsec

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<snip>
> > There are 2 aspects:
> > 
> > 1. IPsec policy matching discussed above:
> >    allow domain-that-should-use-labeled-ipsec 
> ipsec_spd_t:association { polmatch };
> > 
> > 2. Use of IPsec associations themselves:
> > 
> >    For sending:
> >    allow 
> domain-that-should-use-labeled-ipsec-to-label-its-packets 
> self:association { sendto };
> > 
> >    For receiving:
> >    allow domain-that-should-received-from-peer  peer-domain 
> self:association { recvfrom };
> 
> When we consider the case unconfined_t process tries to 
> communicate with a postgresql_t
> process running on another host via labeled IPsec, the 
> following policy will be needed.
> 
> 1.  allow unconfined_t ipsec_spd_t : association { polmatch };

Also, allow postgresql_t ipsec_spd_t : association { polmatch };
since the incoming packet labeled postgresql_t should be checked
against IPsec policy (SPD) rule labeled with ipsec_spd_t.

> 2s. allow unconfined_t self : association { sendto };

OK.

> 2r. allow postgresql_t unconfined_t : association { recvfrom };

This should actually be:

allow unconfined_t postgresql_t : association { recvfrom };

since it would be the unconfined_t socket that would be receiving
a packet using the postgresql_t association.

> 
> Is it correct?
> 
<snip>

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