On 9/25/2022 09:57, Russell Coker wrote:
Some misc patches to make things work in a "strict" configuration.
Allow base user domains to read crypto and vm overcommit status.
Allow pulseaudio to write all user_runtime_content_type named sockets.
Allow sysadm_t to read/write netlink_generic_socket, read
netlink_tcpdiag_socket, have audit_write capability, get schedulint data,
get systemd unit status, talk to logind via dbus, and have direct USB access.
Allow the xserver_role domains to accept a unix_stream_socket from xdm_t and
map xkb_var_lib_t.
Add extra access to the $1_dbusd_t domains.
Allow the ssh agent to write to an inherited xsession log.
Removed the domain systemd_analyze_t, all it's doing is talking to systemd
and formatting the output it gets.
Allow system_cronjob_t to read fs sysctls, and allow ntpd_t to get generic
units status.
I think this is ready to merge.
Signed-off-by: Russell Coker <russell@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
dontaudit $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
+ kernel_read_crypto_sysctls($1_t)
+ kernel_read_vm_overcommit_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_t)
kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_t)
@@ -3664,6 +3666,25 @@ interface(`userdom_relabelfrom_user_runt
')
########################################
+## <summary>
+## write user runtime socket files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute user_runtime_content_type;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:dir list_dir_perms;
+ allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:sock_file write;
+')
+
+########################################
## <summary>
## delete user runtime files
## </summary>
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
@@ -33,11 +33,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
# Local policy
#
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_generic_socket { create setopt bind write read };
+
+# for ptrace
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create write nlmsg_read read };
Please use socket permission sets.
+allow sysadm_t self:capability audit_write;
+allow sysadm_t self:system status;
+
corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_t)
corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(sysadm_t)
corenet_ib_manage_subnet_unlabeled_endports(sysadm_t)
+domain_getsched_all_domains(sysadm_t)
+
+dev_read_cpuid(sysadm_t)
dev_read_kmsg(sysadm_t)
dev_rw_ipmi_dev(sysadm_t)
@@ -59,6 +70,9 @@ init_admin(sysadm_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
+# for systemd-analyze
+files_get_etc_unit_status(sysadm_t)
+
ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
optional_policy(`
init_run_daemon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
@@ -1049,6 +1063,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sysadm_t)
+')
Is this logind access for a privileged operation, or should this
potentially be applied to other userdomains?
+optional_policy(`
tboot_run_txtstat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
')
@@ -1116,6 +1134,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sysadm_t)
usbmodules_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ template(`xserver_restricted_role',`
xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
+ xserver_use_user_fonts($2)
# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
xserver_read_xdm_runtime_files($2)
# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
@@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ template(`xserver_role',`
gen_require(`
type iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t, xauth_home_t;
type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t;
- type mesa_shader_cache_t;
+ type mesa_shader_cache_t, xdm_t;
')
xserver_restricted_role($1, $2, $3, $4)
@@ -212,6 +213,8 @@ template(`xserver_role',`
xserver_read_xkb_libs($2)
+ allow $2 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket accept;
What process is accepting in the user domain?
optional_policy(`
systemd_user_app_status($1, xserver_t)
')
@@ -1256,6 +1259,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+ allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:file map;
')
########################################
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
+ allow $1_dbusd_t $3:dbus send_msg;
allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
dontaudit $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
@@ -105,9 +106,13 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill;
+ allow $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
+
corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
+ dev_read_sysfs($1_dbusd_t)
+
auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -115,6 +120,15 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
systemd_user_daemon_domain($1, dbusd_exec_t, $1_dbusd_t)
systemd_user_unix_stream_activated_socket($1_dbusd_t, session_dbusd_runtime_t)
')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ init_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t)
+ dbus_system_bus_client($1_dbusd_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ xdg_read_data_files($1_dbusd_t)
+ ')
')
#######################################
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
xserver_sigchld_xdm($1_ssh_agent_t)
+ xserver_write_inherited_xsession_log($1_ssh_agent_t)
')
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type;
#
# bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories.
#
-type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t };
+type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t systemd_analyze_exec_t };
typealias bin_t alias { systemd_detect_virt_t systemd_run_exec_t };
corecmd_executable_file(bin_t)
dev_associate(bin_t) #For /dev/MAKEDEV
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -64,10 +64,6 @@ type systemd_activate_t;
type systemd_activate_exec_t;
init_system_domain(systemd_activate_t, systemd_activate_exec_t)
-type systemd_analyze_t;
-type systemd_analyze_exec_t;
-init_daemon_domain(systemd_analyze_t, systemd_analyze_exec_t)
-
type systemd_backlight_t;
type systemd_backlight_exec_t;
init_system_domain(systemd_backlight_t, systemd_backlight_exec_t)
@@ -1695,6 +1691,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_tmpfiles_manage_
')
optional_policy(`
+ dbus_manage_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
dbus_read_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
dbus_relabel_lib_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/cron.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/services/cron.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/cron.te
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ allow system_cronjob_t crond_tmp_t:file
kernel_getattr_core_if(system_cronjob_t)
kernel_getattr_message_if(system_cronjob_t)
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
kernel_read_irq_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_cronjob_t)
kernel_read_network_state(system_cronjob_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(pulseau
userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(pulseaudio_t)
userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t)
userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
+userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
This seems overspecified. Why is this access beyond only user_runtime_t?
tunable_policy(`pulseaudio_execmem',`
allow pulseaudio_t self:process execmem;
Index: refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/ntp.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20220925.orig/policy/modules/services/ntp.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20220925/policy/modules/services/ntp.te
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ term_use_ptmx(ntpd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(ntpd_t)
init_exec_script_files(ntpd_t)
+init_get_generic_units_status(ntpd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(ntpd_t)
--
Chris PeBenito
