On 10/9/21 06:05, Russell Coker wrote:
Allow user domains to read kernel sysctls and crypto sysctls.
Add userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets interface (for pulseaudio_t).
Give sysadm_t more access.
Give dbus domains a little more access.
Allow ssh agent to write to an inherited log file from the X server.
Make systemd_analyze_exec_t an alias for bin_t and remove systemd_analyze_t
omain.
Allow system cronjobs to read fs sysctls.
Signed-off-by: Russell Coker <russell@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
[...]
Index: refpolicy-2.20210908/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210908.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210908/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
@@ -33,11 +33,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
# Local policy
#
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_generic_socket { create setopt bind write read };
+
+# for ptrace
+allow sysadm_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create write nlmsg_read read };
+
+allow sysadm_t self:capability audit_write;
+allow sysadm_t self:system status;
This seems a bit odd. I would have expected sysadm_systemd_t would be the
target. Was the sysadm systemd --user session running in sysadm_t?
corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_t)
corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(sysadm_t)
corenet_ib_manage_subnet_unlabeled_endports(sysadm_t)
+domain_getsched_all_domains(sysadm_t)
+
+dev_read_cpuid(sysadm_t)
dev_read_kmsg(sysadm_t)
logging_watch_all_logs(sysadm_t)
@@ -58,6 +69,9 @@ init_admin(sysadm_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
+# for systemd-analyze
+files_get_etc_unit_status(sysadm_t)
+
ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
optional_policy(`
init_run_daemon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
@@ -1033,6 +1047,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sysadm_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
tboot_run_txtstat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
')
@@ -1100,6 +1118,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sysadm_t)
Is this related to usbmodules?
usbmodules_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20210908/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210908.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210908/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
+ xserver_use_user_fonts($2)
# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
xserver_read_xdm_runtime_files($2)
# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
gen_require(`
type iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t, xauth_home_t;
type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t;
- type mesa_shader_cache_t;
+ type mesa_shader_cache_t, xdm_t;
')
xserver_restricted_role($1, $2)
@@ -184,6 +185,8 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
xserver_read_xkb_libs($2)
+ allow $2 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket accept;
Do you have any context on this? Userdomains don't have read/write xdm_t
unix_stream_socket access, so they wouldn't be able to do anything with it.
+
optional_policy(`
xdg_cache_filetrans($2, mesa_shader_cache_t, dir, "mesa_shader_cache")
')
@@ -1224,6 +1227,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+ allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:file map;
')
########################################
Index: refpolicy-2.20210908/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210908.orig/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210908/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
+ allow $1_dbusd_t $3:dbus send_msg;
allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
dontaudit $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
@@ -103,9 +104,13 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill;
+ allow $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
+
corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
+ dev_read_sysfs($1_dbusd_t)
+
auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
@@ -117,6 +122,15 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
systemd_user_daemon_domain($1, dbusd_exec_t, $1_dbusd_t)
systemd_user_unix_stream_activated_socket($1_dbusd_t, session_dbusd_runtime_t)
')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ init_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t)
+ dbus_system_bus_client($1_dbusd_t)
This opens up bridging the user session busses to the system bus. I don't think
we want this.
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ xdg_read_data_files($1_dbusd_t)
+ ')
')
--
Chris PeBenito
