Hi, On 7/16/20 4:09 PM, Chris PeBenito wrote: > I realized that I missed this. > > On 6/12/20 10:03 AM, bauen1 wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I also agree with most things already said. >> >> I would like to add that the way documentation is currently handled >> involves too much copy + paste of almost meaningless descriptions, but I >> haven't found a very good alternative either. (maybe adding a type >> attribute to the param xml and generating a summary based on that could >> work in the most common cases) > > The original intent with the XML-based docs was for tools to use (see policy.xml). As far as I know, the only tool that ever used it is long-dead (SLIDE). If we can come up with with a better solution that doesn't rule-out the potential for tools, I'd be fine with that. It may go better with a proper HLL and named interface parameters. > >> On 6/12/20 3:02 PM, Russell Coker wrote: >>> Does staff_r even make sense when you could just use >>>>> different MCS categories for different users? >>>> Yes, as user_r cannot reach admin roles whereas staff_r can. >>> The user identity has a permitted list of roles, you can have users who are >>> permitted user_r and sysadm_r and users who are only permitted user_r. The >>> original benefit of staff_r was to protect staff from attacks by user_r >>> accounts, but we can do that protection with the identity based constraints. >> >> I would propose replacing user based constraints with role based >> constraints: >> The user part of the context (normally) doesn't change after login, this >> means that files edited by a staff_u user become inaccessible by anyone >> else, even if sudo is used to change to staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t, but >> reducing the user based constraints for staff_u is undesirable. > > This behavior depends on the type of the file. If you end up with a staff_u:object_r:etc_t context, the user separations don't apply since this is not a user file. I'll have to take another look at it then. > We used to have role based separations but it was encoded into the TE rules and generated an enormous amount of rule duplication. There are some remaining examples of this, e.g. in the su and sudo policies (staff_su_t, sysadm_su_t). There are cases where these will still be necessary, mainly when type transitions to the user type are required, but some could be eliminated. > When the default_* statements were implemented I started to reimplement the role-based separations using the role, but then I lost the work before I finished. I don't think it is too involved, since it may be as simple copying the UBAC infrastructure and tweaking it to work on roles. I've also worked on implementing RBAC and RBACSEP for refpolicy (A bit messy: https://github.com/bauen1/refpolicy/tree/rbac) . If this becomes a goal to implement, perhaps https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/pull/203 could be merged first. In my CIL policy (https://gitlab.com/bauen1/bauen1-policy/) I use RBAC/RBACSEP and share the types for the generic desktop user between roles, so `user_u:user_r:user_t` becomes `user.user:user.role:user.type` and `staff_u:staff_r:staff_t` becomes `staff.user:staff.role:user.type`. When different permissions and type transitions are necessary "derived" types are used, e.g. for `sysadm.user:sysadm.role:sysadm.type`. This can reduce the amount of types and type enforcement rules by a lot when declaring multiple users that all share the same type rules (but maybe have additional roles). I'm not sure how well this works in practice yet. -- bauen1 https://dn42.bauen1.xyz/
