Re: [PATCH] gpg

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On 1/8/19 3:51 AM, Russell Coker wrote:


Description: Create user_gpg_t etc domains, remove gpg_helper_t & gpg_pinentry_t
  Only transition to gpg_t from user_t to solve problems with X sessions.


I'd keep staff too, as that is also an unpriv role.


  Also remove gpg_helper_t and gpg_pinentry_t because they don't do any good.
Can you give a little more of an argument as to why they're not helpful? I'm not against this, but I don't see what the argument is.
Also, if they are removed, all the rules need to be removed, not just eliminate the labeling. 



Author: Russell Coker <russell@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Last-Update: 2015-01-12

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ HOME_DIR/\.gnupg/S\.scdaemon		-s	gen_con
  /usr/bin/gpg(2)?			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
  /usr/bin/gpgsm				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
  /usr/bin/gpg-agent			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_agent_exec_t,s0)
-/usr/bin/pinentry.*			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_pinentry_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/pinentry.*			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
/usr/lib/gnupg/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0) 
-/usr/lib/gnupg/gpgkeys.*		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_helper_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/gnupg/gpgkeys.*		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
/run/user/%{USERID}/gnupg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_runtime_t,s0) 
  /run/user/%{USERID}/gnupg/S\.gpg-agent.* -s	gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_agent_tmp_t,s0)
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
@@ -118,10 +118,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
  	')
optional_policy(` 
-		gpg_role(staff_r, staff_t)
-	')
-
-	optional_policy(`
  		irc_role(staff_r, staff_t)
  	')
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te 
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
@@ -1304,10 +1304,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
  	')
optional_policy(` 
-		gpg_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
-	')
-
-	optional_policy(`
  		irc_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
  	')
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if 
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ interface(`gpg_role',`
  	domtrans_pattern($2, gpg_exec_t, gpg_t)
  	domtrans_pattern($2, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t)
+ # transition to user_t when running ck-launch-session or other bin_t 
+	corecmd_bin_domtrans(gpg_agent_t, $2)
+	allow gpg_agent_t $2:process signull;
+	allow $2 gpg_agent_t:fd use;
+
  	allow $2 self:process setrlimit;
  	allow $2 { gpg_t gpg_agent_t gpg_helper_t gpg_pinentry_t }:process { ptrace signal_perms };
  	ps_process_pattern($2, { gpg_t gpg_agent_t gpg_helper_t gpg_pinentry_t })
@@ -46,6 +51,9 @@ interface(`gpg_role',`
  	filetrans_pattern($2, gpg_secret_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, sock_file, "log-socket")
  	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, gpg_secret_t, dir, ".gnupg")
+ # so gpg_agent_t can append to .xsession-errors 
+	userdom_append_inherited_user_home_content_files(gpg_agent_t)
+
  	optional_policy(`
  		gpg_pinentry_dbus_chat($2)
  	')
@@ -179,6 +187,28 @@ interface(`gpg_signal',`
  	allow $1 gpg_t:process signal;
  ')
+####################################### 
+## <summary>
+##      Transition to $2_gpg_agent_t from another domain via gpg_agent_exec_t
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##      <summary>
+##      source domain
+##      </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+##      <summary>
+##      base of target domain
+##      </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`gpg_enter_user_gpg_agent_domain',`
+        gen_require(`
+                type gpg_agent_exec_t, $2_gpg_agent_t;
+        ')
+        domain_auto_transition_pattern($1, gpg_agent_exec_t, $2_gpg_agent_t)
+')
+
  ########################################
  ## <summary>
  ##	Read and write gpg agent pipes.
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
  		spamassassin_role(user_r, user_t)
  	')
- optional_policy(` 
+        optional_policy(`
  		ssh_role_template(user, user_r, user_t)
+		gpg_enter_user_gpg_agent_domain(user_ssh_agent_t)
  	')
optional_policy(` 
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
@@ -2139,6 +2139,24 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_append_user
######################################## 
  ## <summary>
+##	Allow append on inherited user home files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain to allow.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`userdom_append_inherited_user_home_content_files',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type user_home_t;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 user_home_t:file { append getattr ioctl };
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
  ##	Do not audit attempts to write user home files.
  ## </summary>
  ## <param name="domain">
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
  	ps_process_pattern($3, $1_ssh_agent_t)
domtrans_pattern($3, ssh_agent_exec_t, $1_ssh_agent_t) 
+	userdom_append_inherited_user_home_content_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_ssh_agent_t) Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/dbus.if 
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
  	domain_entry_file($1_dbusd_t, dbusd_exec_t)
  	ubac_constrained($1_dbusd_t)
+ # for .xsession-errors 
+	userdom_append_inherited_user_home_content_files($1_dbusd_t)
+
  	role $2 types $1_dbusd_t;
############################## 
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
  	# Local policy
  	#
- allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; 
+	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
  	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
  	allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
@@ -213,7 +216,7 @@ interface(`dbus_all_session_bus_client', 
  	allow $1 { session_bus_type self }:dbus send_msg;
  	allow session_bus_type $1:dbus send_msg;
- allow $1 session_bus_type:unix_stream_socket connectto; 
+	allow $1 session_bus_type:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
  	allow $1 session_bus_type:fd use;
  ')
@@ -246,7 +249,7 @@ interface(`dbus_spec_session_bus_client' 
  	allow $2 { $1_dbusd_t self }:dbus send_msg;
  	allow $1_dbusd_t $2:dbus send_msg;
- allow $2 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; 
+	allow $2 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
  	allow $2 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
  ')
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/cron.if 
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/services/cron.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/cron.if
@@ -862,10 +862,31 @@ interface(`cron_read_system_job_tmp_file
  	')
files_search_tmp($1) 
+	allow $1 system_cronjob_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms;
  	allow $1 system_cronjob_tmp_t:file read_file_perms;
  ')
######################################## 
+## <summary>
+##	Read/write system cron job temporary files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`cron_rw_system_job_tmp_files',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type system_cronjob_tmp_t;
+	')
+
+	files_search_tmp($1)
+	allow $1 system_cronjob_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+	allow $1 system_cronjob_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
  ## <summary>
  ##	Do not audit attempts to append temporary
  ##	system cron job files.
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te
@@ -184,8 +184,9 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
optional_policy(` 
-	cron_system_entry(gpg_t, gpg_exec_t)
  	cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(gpg_t)
+	cron_rw_system_job_tmp_files(gpg_t)
+	cron_system_entry(gpg_t, gpg_exec_t)
  ')
optional_policy(` 




--
Chris PeBenito
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