US-CERT Technical Cyber Security Alert TA05-026A -- Multiple Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS

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                Technical Cyber Security Alert TA05-026A
        Multiple Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS

   Original release date: January 26, 2005
   Last revised: --
   Source: US-CERT

Systems Affected

     * Cisco routers and switches running IOS in various configurations

Overview

   Several denial-of-service vulnerabilities have been discovered in
   Cisco's Internet Operating System (IOS). A remote attacker may be able
   to cause an affected device to reload the operating system.

I. Description

   Cisco has published three advisories describing flaws in IOS that
   could allow a remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload.
   Further details are available in the following vulnerability notes:

   VU#583638 - Cisco IOS contains DoS vulnerability in MPLS packet
   processing

   The IOS implementation of Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)
   contains a vulnerability that allows malformed MPLS packets to cause
   an affected device to reload. An unauthenticated attacker can send
   these malformed packets on a local network segment that is connected
   to a vulnerable device interface.

   VU#472582 - Cisco IOS IPv6 denial-of-service vulnerability

   A vulnerability in the way that IOS handles a sequence of specially
   crafted IPv6 packets could cause an affected device to reload,
   resulting in a denial of service. The vulnerability is exposed on both
   physical interfaces (i.e., hardware interfaces), and logical
   interfaces (i.e., software defined interfaces such as tunnels) that
   are configured for IPv6.

   VU#689326 - Cisco IOS vulnerable to DoS via malformed BGP packet

   An IOS device that is enabled for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and
   set up with the bgp log-neighbor-changes option is vulnerable to a
   denial-of-service attack via a malformed BGP packet.

II. Impact

   Although the underlying causes of these three vulnerabilities is
   different, in each case a remote attacker could cause an affected
   device to reload the operating system. This creates a
   denial-of-service condition since packets are not forwarded through
   the affected device while it is reloading. Repeated exploitation of
   these vulnerabilites would result in a sustained denial-of-service
   condition.

   Since devices running IOS may transit traffic for a number of other
   networks, the secondary impacts of a denial of service may be severe.

III. Solution

Upgrade to a fixed version of IOS

   Cisco has updated versions of its IOS software to address these
   vulnerabilities. Please refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes"
   sections of the Cisco Security Advisories listed in Appendix A for
   more information on upgrading.

Workaround

   Cisco has also published practical workarounds for VU#689326 and
   VU#583638. Please refer to the "Workarounds" section of each Cisco
   Security Advisory listed in Appendix A for more information.

   Sites that are unable to install an upgraded version of IOS are
   encouraged to implement these workarounds.

Appendix A. References

     * Cisco Security Advisory: Crafted Packet Causes Reload on Cisco
       Routers -
       <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050126-les.shtml>
     * Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Crafted IPv6 Packets Cause
       Reload -
       <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050126-ipv6.shtml>
     * Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Malformed BGP Packet Causes
       Reload -
       <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050126-bgp.shtml>
     * US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#583638 -
       <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/583638>
     * US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#472582 -
       <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/472582>
     * US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#689326 -
       <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/689326>
     _________________________________________________________________

   Feedback can be directed to the authors: Will Dormann, Chad Dougherty,
   and Damon Morda
     _________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
      <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA05-026A.html>
     _________________________________________________________________

   Copyright 2005 Carnegie Mellon University.
   Terms of use: <http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
     _________________________________________________________________

   Revision History

   January 26, 2005: Initial release


                       Last updated January 26, 2005 

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