> > > > diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> > > > index 95d0611c5fc7..55699c573541 100644
> > > > @@ -7277,13 +7289,23 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_get(struct inode *inode,
> > > > const struct qstr *qstr,
> > > > struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si)
> > > > {
> > > > + int ret;
> > > > +
> > > > /* check whether ocfs2 support feature xattr */
> > > > if (!ocfs2_supports_xattr(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb)))
> > > > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > > - if (si)
> > > > - return security_old_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
> > > > - &si->name, &si->value,
> > > > - &si->value_len);
> > > > + if (si) {
> > > > + ret = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
> > > > + &ocfs2_initxattrs, si);
> > >
> > > The "if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))" test exists in both
> > > security_old_inode_init_security() and security_inode_init_security(),
> > > but return different values. In the former case, it returns
> > > -EOPNOTSUPP. In the latter case, it returns 0. The question is
> > > whether or not we need to be concerned about private inodes on ocfs2.
> > > If private inodes on ocfs2 are possible, then ocsf2_mknod() or
> > > ocfs2_symlink() would fail to create the inode or symlink.
> >
> > Correction, previously when returning -EOPNOTSUPP for private inodes,
> > xattrs would not be wrriten. By returning 0 without setting si->enable
> > to 0, xattrs will be written.
>
> Ok, but if there is a private inode, we would be setting si->enable to
> zero. Should be ok, I guess.
si->enable is being set to zero, below, but is conditional on !si-
>name.
This is the last concern, otherwise the patch set looks good.
> > > > + /*
> > > > + * security_inode_init_security() does not return -EOPNOTSUPP,
> > > > + * we have to check the xattr ourselves.
> > > > + */
> > > > + if (!ret && !si->name)
> > > > + si->enable = 0;
> > > > +
> > > > + return ret;
> > > > + }
> > > >
> > > > return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
> > > > &ocfs2_initxattrs, NULL);
>
--
thanks,
Mimi
