On 2/25/20 10:09 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 at 16:34, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since >> they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables >> to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for new EFI >> tables. >> >> This fixes a bug where an EFI TPM log table has been created by UEFI, but >> it lives in memory that has been marked as usable rather than reserved. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> > > Thanks Tom > > Mind respinning this on top of efi/next? Sure, no problem, v2 on the way. I wasn't sure if this would go through the x86 tree or the efi tree (though this should apply cleanly to efi/next with just a few lines of offset). Thanks, Tom > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git/> > Thanks, > > >> --- >> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ >> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c >> index ae923ee8e2b4..eba5038c7a44 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c >> @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { >> #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE >> &rci2_table_phys, >> #endif >> + &efi.rng_seed, >> + &efi.tpm_log, >> + &efi.tpm_final_log, >> }; >> >> u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */ >> -- >> 2.17.1 >>
