Tom Lane wrote:
"David Legault" <legault.david@xxxxxxxxx> writes: I've been dying to get 2 cents in on this. Tell me if this suggestion makes any sense. We use real database users in our systems, we don't connect in with an over-endowed user and then arbitrate security in client code. Therefore, we depend entirely upon the server's ability to enforce security. The practical advantage of this, which is huge, is that nowhere in my Postgres settings do I have to make allowance for the web user (apache) to "go root" with respect to Postgres. As a general rule we consider this good of course, because a remote exploit on the web server could not do anything the user could not do anyway. Except for the hole. On a public site that lets users register, we have to have way to let the web server assume the role of somebody who has createuser privelege, and that's pretty much the end of the no-root policy. If an exploit could be placed, it could simply go into that mode and create a superuser. What would be really nice is if you could limit the ability of CREATEUSER to grant roles. A nice general solution would be to allow a user with CREATEUSER privelege to only put other users into the same groups that person is in, or perhaps into a list specified by a higher-privelege user. What's chances of anything like that showing up? And, dumb question, am I mistaking the purpose of INHERIT and it already does what I'm saying? I don't think so because INHERIT does not let somebody create users out of the void. This is documented someplace ... ah, under CREATE ROLE: : The INHERIT attribute governs inheritance of grantable privileges (that : is, access privileges for database objects and role memberships). It : does not apply to the special role attributes set by CREATE ROLE and : ALTER ROLE. For example, being a member of a role with CREATEDB : privilege does not immediately grant the ability to create databases, : even if INHERIT is set; it would be necessary to become that role via : SET ROLE before creating a database. The main reason we did that is that SUPERUSER seemed a bit too dangerous to be an inheritable privilege. You could argue the other role attribute bits either way, but for simplicity they all act the same. regards, tom lane ---------------------------(end of broadcast)--------------------------- TIP 6: explain analyze is your friend |
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