> The EFS encryption as you described it adds nothing but a > false sense of security (and the ability to use some more > buzzwords). The level of protection is just the same of a > Unix file with the right permissions. > The key point here is that both the 'postgres' user and > 'administrator' > have _transparent_ access to the file contents. No password required. While most of what you wrote is definitly correct, you missed a few things about EFS. 1) Administrator does not necessarily have *transparent* access. It's only the users access that is transparent. 2) It is quite possible to remove the administrator recovery key. This can be used to protect *against* administrators reading the file. You do *not* need to have *any* recovery key. 2b) It's even so that in Windows XP (and I think 2003), if it is *not* a member of a domain, there *is* no default recovery key. In a domain, it's the domain admins key, or whatever is configured in your domain policy. In 2000, it's the local admin that first logs on to the box. 3) The recommended practice is to have the recovery key only available off-line, locked into a separate building with half an army defending it. Or something like that. At least put it in a smartcard that nobody can access without going through lots and lots of safe checks on who they are. So it does offer a bit of extra security. "Just" to protect the key used to set up the SSL sessions, I'm not sure it's worth it. Because again, if they hack your admin account, they can get to your files *without* going thruogh getting into the SSL stream. //Magnus ---------------------------(end of broadcast)--------------------------- TIP 1: subscribe and unsubscribe commands go to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
