Greetings,
Yes, you are correct. And
For applications/systems/scripts relying on this information may require sgnificent modifications to handle the restricted access.
Alternative approches can be.
Auditing and monitoring.
You can use pgaudit extension for auditing and minitoring.
Use SE-PostgeSQL extension that give fine grained access control other than PG standard permissions.
Try RLS row level security. May involve careful planning and may not cover all use cases.
Regards,
Salahuddin.
On Fri, 24 May 2024, 22:02 Tom Lane, <tgl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Andreas Joseph Krogh <andreas@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> Hi, is there a way to prevent a user/role from SELECT-ing from certain
> system-tables?
> I'd like the contents of pg_{user,roles,database} to not be visible to all
> users.
As noted, you can in principle revoke the public SELECT grant from
those views/catalogs. However, the system is not designed to hide
such information, which means you'll have (at least) two kinds of
issues to worry about:
1. Queries or tools breaking that you didn't expect to break.
It's hardly uncommon for instance for queries on pg_class to
join to pg_roles to get the owner names for tables.
2. Information leaks. For example, mapping role OID to role name
is trivial with either regrole or pg_get_userbyid(), so it
wouldn't take long to scan the plausible range of role OIDs and
get all their names, even without SQL access to the underlying
catalog.
regards, tom lane
