On 2022-12-22 11:15:57 +0100, Rainer Duffner wrote: > > > Am 22.12.2022 um 10:46 schrieb Peter J. Holzer <hjp-pgsql@xxxxxx>: > > If the hacker has root access: What prevents them from talking to the > HSM? > > > > I wasn’t involved in setting it up here, but AFAIK you need to „enroll“ the > client to the HSM. > > That is a one-time process that requires HSM credentials (via certificates and > pass-phrases). > > Then, that client can talk to the HSM. Which means that some sort of access-token is stored on the client. So what prevents a hacker from using that access token? > The HSM-client is (or should be) engineered in such a way that you can’t > extract the encryption-secret easily. Security by obscurity? Just hope that nobody figures out how that access token is stored? That doesn't seem like a good strategy against high-level threats. hp -- _ | Peter J. Holzer | Story must make more sense than reality. |_|_) | | | | | hjp@xxxxxx | -- Charles Stross, "Creative writing __/ | http://www.hjp.at/ | challenge!"
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