On 04/20/2018 05:43 PM, Ron wrote:
On 04/20/2018 06:11 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
Greetings,
* Ron (ronljohnsonjr@xxxxxxxxx) wrote:
On 04/20/2018 03:55 PM, Vick Khera wrote:
On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 11:24 AM, Vikas Sharma <shavikas@xxxxxxxxx
For anyone to offer a proper solution, you need to say what purpose
your
encryption will serve. Does the data need to be encrypted at rest?
Does it
need to be encrypted in memory? Does it need to be encrypted at the
database level or at the application level? Do you need to be able to
query the data? There are all sorts of scenarios and use cases, and
you
need to be more specific.
For me, using whole-disk encryption solved my need, which was to
ensure
that the data on disk cannot be read once removed from the server.
Someone really needs to explain that to me. My company-issued laptop
has
WDE, and that's great for when the machine is shut down and I'm
carrying it
from place to place, but when it's running, all the data is
transparently
decrypted for every process that wants to read the data, including
malware,
industrial spies,
Thus, unless you move your DB server on a regular basis, I can't see
the
usefulness of WDE on a static machine.
The typical concern (aka, attack vector) isn't around moving the DB
server on a regular basis or about someone breaking into your data
center and stealing your drives, it's making sure that disposal of
equipment doesn't result in valuable data being retained on the
drives when they leave the data center for replacement or disposal.
That makes some sense, but years of added CPU overhead to mitigate a
problem that could be solved by writing zeros to the disk as a step in
the decomm process seems more than a bit wasteful.
Well you probably need to drive a nail through the drive but that's a
technical detail :)
