* David G Johnston (david.g.johnston@xxxxxxxxx) wrote: > My quick take-away from RLS compared to traditional multi-tenant security > policies is that with RLS you move the security logic into the database and > leverage the native database roles. Your model likely makes use of a single > user associated with an application and that application applies the > security logic during its interactions with the client-users that it > maintains separately. Note that you could still use RLS even with a single application user logging into PG. This can be done by having an authentication mechanism which is implemented in the database using a security definer function which updates a table (most likely unlogged, as it's for current sessions only and needs to be performant) that indicates which user is logged in for the current database connection. The RLS policies would then refer to that table to determine which rows can be operated on. The table would need to be cleaned up at the end of the session, but that should be reasonably straight-forward to do (again, with a security definer function). Another option might be an extension which provides a GUC that can be updated with a security definer function (but not otherwise) and which is cleared at DISCARD ALL. That requires the application to still handle the user authentication (instead of having the security definer function handle that), but as that's already happening today, it might not be an issue and would still allow removal of most of the application-side authorization complexity in favor of using RLS policies. Thanks! Stephen
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