On 01/17/2011 11:31 PM, Jensen Somers wrote:
But, from your initial reply I understood that a user can simply browse to my database installation folder (e.g.: C:/ProgramData/MyApp/data), read out and/or modify a configuration file and he can access the entire database and modify the data. And that's what I want to prevent.
Correct. If the user has local administrator rights on their computer (as is the case with basically all non-corporate systems) they can just find and modify pg_hba.conf to set "trust" authentication then connect with PgAdmin III or psql and do what they like.
PostgreSQL doesn't attempt to provide half-measure security against a local user with system administrative rights. That's mostly because, unlike the other databases you're talking about, it's not really designed for application embedded use.
You might want to check out Firebird, which is designed for embedded use. I don't know if it has encrypted data file storage options and other weak-security-against-priveleged-local-user stuff, but it's going to be a more viable option than Pg will.
-- Craig Ringer -- Sent via pgsql-general mailing list (pgsql-general@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-general
