I understand that PKCS12 cannot be implemented in the fips provider but I'm looking for a suitable workaround, particularly something that is close to the same behavior as 1.0.2 with the fips 2.0 module. In my case, the default provider is loaded but I am calling EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=yes"). I can wrap calls to the PKCS12 APIs and momentarily allow non-fips algorithms (ie: "fips=no" or "provider=default") but that prevents the PKCS12 implementation from using the crypto implementations in the fips provider. Is there a property string or some other way to allow PKCS12KDF in the default provider as well as the crypto methods in the fips provider? I have tried "provider=default,fips=yes" but that doesn't seem to work. Using the default provider is probably a reasonable workaround for reading in PKCS12 files in order to maintain backwards compatibility. Is there a recommended method going forward that would allow reading and writing to a key store while only using the fips provider? Thanks, Zeke Evans Micro Focus -----Original Message----- From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of Dr Paul Dale Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2021 5:22 PM To: openssl-users@xxxxxxxxxxx Subject: Re: PKCS12 APIs with fips 3.0 I'm not even sure that NIST can validate the PKCS#12 KDF. If it can't be validated, it doesn't belong in the FIPS provider. Pauli On 26/1/21 10:48 pm, Tomas Mraz wrote: > On Tue, 2021-01-26 at 11:45 +0000, Matt Caswell wrote: >> >> On 26/01/2021 11:05, Jakob Bohm via openssl-users wrote: >>> On 2021-01-25 17:53, Zeke Evans wrote: >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Many of the PKCS12 APIs (ie: PKCS12_create, PKCS12_parse, >>>> PKCS12_verify_mac) do not work in OpenSSL 3.0 when using the fips >>>> provider. It looks like that is because they try to load PKCS12KDF >>>> which is not implemented in the fips provider. These were all >>>> working in 1.0.2 with the fips 2.0 module. Will they be supported >>>> in 3.0 with fips? If not, is there a way for applications running >>>> in fips approved mode to support the same functionality and use >>>> existing stores/files that contain PKCS12 objects? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> This is an even larger issue: Is OpenSSL 3.x so badly designed that >>> the "providers" need to separately implement every standard or >>> non-standard combination of algorithm invocations? >>> >>> In a properly abstracted design PKCS12KDF would be implemented by >>> invoking general EVP functions for underlying algorithms, which >>> would in turn invoke the provider versions of those algorithms. >> >> This is exactly the way it works. The implementation of PKCS12KDF >> fetches the underlying digest algorithm using whatever providers it >> has available. So, for example, if the PKCS12KDF implementation needs >> to use SHA256, then it will fetch an available implementation for it >> - and that implementation may come from the FIPS provider (or any >> other provider). >> >> However, in 3.0, KDFs are themselves fetchable cryptographic >> algorithms implemented by providers. The FIPS module implements a set >> of KDFs - but PKCS12KDF is not one of them. Its only available from >> the default provider. >> >> So, the summary is, while you can set things up so that all your >> crypto, including any digests used by the PKCS12KDF, all come from >> the FIPS provider, there is no getting away from the fact that you >> still need to have the default provider loaded in order to have an >> implementation of the PKCS12KDF itself - which will obviously be >> outside the module boundary. >> >> There aren't any current plans to bring the implementation of >> PKCS12KDF inside the FIPS module. I don't know whether that is >> feasible or not. > > IMO PKCS12KDF should not be in the FIPS module as this is not a FIPS > approved KDF algorithm. Besides that KDF should not IMO be needed for > "modern" PKCS12 files. I need to test that though. >
