On Wednesday, 16 January 2019 13:22:53 CET Eliot Lear wrote: > Hi Hubert > > On 16.01.19 12:27, Hubert Kario wrote: > > For maintaining signatures that need to be valid long into the future > > standards like CAdES should be used. They keep time of signing in > > timestamps signed by trusted time-stamping authorities, along with the > > rest of revocation data necessary to verify the original signature. > > Understood. At this point in the maturity cycle of the technology, > we're just not there yet. My choices are, have people ignore invalid > signatures in their entirety or provide something more nuanced for now. you don't have to start with implementing the full CAdES-LTA, you can start with just adding support for timestamping, the CAdES-T using time from the signature to verify it is as good as ignoring the certificate expiration date - if you need to make the signatures verifiable now, do that, not use the false sense of security of using easily fakeable date -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
-- openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
