> On Jul 25, 2018, at 4:50 PM, Ken Goldman <kgoldman@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > For background, this is the TPM 1.2 endorsement key certificate. I.e., this is a real application with millions of certificates issued. The key is an RSA-2048 key. > > The TCG (for a while) specified > > Public Key Algorithm: rsaesOaep > > rather than the commonly used > > Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption > > because the key is an encryption key rather than a signing key. > The X509 certificate parser fails to get the public key. > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > An alternative fix (I got a patch for 098 from an openssl maintainer) > that accepts rsaOaep would also fix the issue. Or perhaps both. It is not clear that my choice of rejecting unsupported key algorithms at security level 0 is the right one, but it would of course be best if the key algorithm were supported if it has non-negligible "legitimate" use. Perhaps open an issue (or PR) on github proposing (or implementing) a change to the check_key_level() logic and see whether there is support for it? -- Viktor. -- openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
