On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 3:04 AM, Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 05.03.2018 11:57, Dr. Matthias St. Pierre wrote:
>
> However, I am sceptical whether this approach will be accepted,
> because there are (at least) two potential problems:
>
> * Normally, it is mandatory to check the result of FIPS_mode_set() or
> FIPS_mode() to ensure that the FIPS initialization succeeded. However,
> an application which is not FIPS-aware won't check the result.
> * It can happen that applications which have their own configuration
> and enable/disable FIPS mode explicitely, call FIPS_mode_set(0)
> afterwards.
>
>
> HTH,
> Matthias
>
One more obstacle: In FIPS mode it is not allowed to use low level
crypto algorithms, only the EVP interface is allowed. So most of your
non-fips-aware applications will malfunction when forced into FIPS mode.
The consequence is: it's probably not possible to do it.
Did you mean if an application uses the low level crypto algorithm functions (e.g. SHA256_Init/ SHA256_Update/ SHA256_Final) then they won't work under FIPS mode (and hence may cause unpredictable issues)?
Matthias
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