> By raising the limit, you don't suddenly put every application at risk of a DoS,
> because these applications won't suddenly use a 16k RSA key.
Instead of raising the limit of client key exchange message length more than 2048, why can't we add the
"ssl3_check_client_hello" functionality in the ssl/s3_srvr.c because that will "permit appropriate message length".
I came across this functionality when I compared the code of openssl-1.0.1p and openssl-1.0.2e.
Regards,
Saurabh
________________________________
From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxx> on behalf of openssl-users-request@xxxxxxxxxxx <openssl-users-request at openssl.org>
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2016 6:38 PM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: openssl-users Digest, Vol 20, Issue 18
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K modulus (Salz, Rich)
2. Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K modulus (Salz, Rich)
3. Re: Help finding replacement for ASN1_seq_unpack_X509
(Jim Carroll)
4. Re: [openssl-users] Help finding replacement for
ASN1_seq_unpack_X509 (Salz, Rich)
5. Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K modulus (Erwann Abalea)
6. Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K modulus (Salz, Rich)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 12:15:15 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K
modulus
Message-ID:
<f3934079655b4d8fa3328b21ea62ef6f at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
> Largest accepted client key exchange message length seems to be set to 2048 bytes.
> Key exchange for an RSA16k is slightly larger than that (exactly 2048 bytes of pure crypto payload, plus a few bytes of overhead).
> OpenSSL is too conservative here.
Why not use an ECC key?
We have to make trade-offs. Who uses a 16K RSA key?
------------------------------
Message: 2
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 12:17:44 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K
modulus
Message-ID:
<e8e3f6f5b5a849ab8000dab434aace1d at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
> We have to make trade-offs. Who uses a 16K RSA key?
Let me add some clarification. Is it worth putting every application that uses OpenSSL at risk for a DoS attack with a 16K RSA key?
--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz at jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
------------------------------
Message: 3
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 08:52:24 -0400
From: "Jim Carroll" <jim@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: Help finding replacement for
ASN1_seq_unpack_X509
Message-ID: <00e201d1e34e$ba83f760$2f8be620$@carroll.com>
We are porting M2Crypto which is a python swig wrapper around OpenSSL. It
currently supports OpenSSL 0.9.8 and we are porting it to 1.1.0. The 1.1.0
branch is really cool (clean, elegant code), but there were a few
refactoring's that affected M2Crypto. Most were trivial getter/setter type
changes, but a few were in the are of getting rid of some ASN1 processing
(which happens to be our weakest point of understanding).
We're left with porting the final bit -- which is related to X509 cert
handling. Here's a sample use. The caller builds up the call with a the
following 'psuedo-sequence'. get_der() is the function we are working on
finishing.
X508* load_cert_bio(char* filename) {
BIO* bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
return PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
unsigned char* get_der(int* len_out) {
X509* cert = load_cert_bio("x509.pem");
X509* ca = load_cert_bio("ca.pem");
STACK_OF(X509)* stack = sk_x509_new_null();
sk_x509_push(stack, cert);
sk_x509_push(stack, ca);
return ASN1_seq_pack_X509(stack, i2d_X509, NULL, len_out);
}
The ASN1_seq_pack_X509 was a macro -- and has been removed.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On
> Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2016 4:35 AM
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Help finding replacement for
> ASN1_seq_unpack_X509
>
> > Would it be acceptable to just iterate the stack elements, passing
> each X509
> > through i2d_X509 and appending the results -- would that generate
> valid
> > DER?
>
> Maybe. It depends on what the receiver is expecting. If it's willing
> to read a set of certs until it hits EOF (or equivalent) that's fine.
> But if you're sending a SEQUENCE OF certificates then you need to wrap
> it in an ASN1/DER container. For example, Netscape Cert Sequence
>
> Can you post a code snippet?
>
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
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`
end
------------------------------
Message: 4
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 12:57:09 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: Help finding replacement for
ASN1_seq_unpack_X509
Message-ID:
<b54c7abdcf9d4d589ff40e7603228ba4 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
> STACK_OF(X509)* stack = sk_x509_new_null();
> sk_x509_push(stack, cert);
> sk_x509_push(stack, ca);
>
> return ASN1_seq_pack_X509(stack, i2d_X509, NULL, len_out);
Okay, so your just pushing two DER-format blobs one after the other.
Yes, what you thought to do is fine. :)
------------------------------
Message: 5
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 12:31:56 +0000
From: Erwann Abalea <Erwann.Abalea@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K
modulus
Message-ID: <C1C086D5-5270-4595-8ED6-D6D69DF0C7E1 at docusign.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> Le 21 juil. 2016 ? 14:17, Salz, Rich <rsalz at akamai.com> a ?crit :
>
>> We have to make trade-offs. Who uses a 16K RSA key?
>
> Let me add some clarification. Is it worth putting every application that uses OpenSSL at risk for a DoS attack with a 16K RSA key?
By raising the limit, you don?t suddenly put every application at risk of a DoS, because these applications won?t suddenly use a 16k RSA key.
Anyway, OpenSSL 1.0.2+ now sets some limits on message sizes (defensive), some tradeoffs have to be done on those limits. According to some sources (NIST and ECRYPT II), 16k RSA provides an equivalent security level of a 512bits ECC key.
------------------------------
Message: 6
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 13:08:52 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: Openssl software failure for RSA 16K
modulus
Message-ID:
<e54921bc7b864c64bda6fd688172240c at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>By raising the limit, you don?t suddenly put every application at risk of a DoS,
> because these applications won?t suddenly use a 16k RSA key.
Yes we do, because the other side could send a key, not local config.
------------------------------
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