Re: Authentication using federated identity

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Practically speaking, most popular IAM and SSO solutions offer OIDC SAML tokens but do not offer Kerberos tickets.  OpenID Connect is a standard which itself is based on RFC6749 (OAuth2). This provides a compelling reason to support it in addition to Kerberos.  I'll also note that OIDC tokens are easy to validate without a bidirectional trust relationship between the IdP and RP.

SSH authentication via OAuth2, in particular, would save complexity at most organizations I've worked with.  All of them so far have preferred things like automated SSH certificate signers or APIs that cause orchestration to add SSH keys to authorized_keys on hosts, before they implement Kerberos just for this.

On top of that, Active Directory is a legacy solution now.  Its successor uses OAuth2.

On 2024-02-08 23:49, Nico Kadel-Garcia wrote:
On Thu, Feb 8, 2024 at 1:18 PM Chris Rapier <rapier@xxxxxxx> wrote:
I know that there are some methods to use federated identities (e.g.
OAuth2) with SSH authentication but, from what I've seen, they largely
seem clunky and require users to interact with web browsers to get one
time tokens. Which is sort of acceptable for occasional logins but
doesn't work with automated/scripted actions.
Is there some reason you wouldn't simply use Kerberos, baked into
Samba and Active Directory, with the long established token handling
provided by Kerberos? Convincing Kerbers and the AD admin who may not
realize they have it to permit that underlying authentication
technology, but it's been stable for decades  Part of the difficulty
seems to be every bureaucracy's desire to have their own special rules
and not talk to each other without a lot of Gant charts and big
picture diagrams, but I've been taking advantage of the underlying
Kerberos behind the backs of AD admin for decades.

Unfortunately, everyone seems to want to have their own "invented
here" form of authentication token handling, rather than sticking with
basics. My old classmates at MIT worked *very hard* to make that work,
and to resist abuse, and it still works quite well.


I'm just wondering if anyone has done any work on this or has thoughts
on it. I know it would be useful in some contexts (in my case, cross
realm access of independent yet federated services that are pretty
common in R&E HPC communities (e.g. ACCESS)).

Chris
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