On Mon, 19 Sep 2022, Brian Candler wrote: > On 19/09/2022 22:45, Damien Miller wrote: > > > AFAICT, this allows anyone with*any* user certificate signed by the CA > > > to authenticate, with or without principals. That's clearly less than > > > ideal, but at least it was configured explicitly on this account, and > > > the attack surface is limited to that one particular account. > > Right, that's the use-case. > > OK, but I don't see how to configure "accept a certificate with no > principals", versus "accept a certificate with *any* set of principals" Ah, that seems to have been broken at some point. I guess nobody uses it for authorized_keys... -d _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
