Re: Certificate spec anomaly?

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On 9/19/22 20:57, Brian Candler wrote:
On the other hand, the spec at https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=1.19&content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup says:

> As a special case, a zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for any principal of the specified type.

I cannot imagine any reasonable rationale for that.

I think the behaviour of sshd is sane and sensible. A "super-certificate" which can impersonate any user (or any host[^2]) seems like a dangerous thing to me;

+1

In general a digital certificate is a signed statement by a CA saying: "This public key belongs to this name/ID. Trust me!"

Thus if there's no name or ID in the certificate it's not a valid certificate.

I wonder if the protocol documentation is out of step,

IMO yes.

Ciao, Michael.

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