What are the cryptographic consequences of host name hah collision? My point is - the only reason to consider replacing the algorithm here would be to avoid varying around another hash that is not usable cryptographically. Regards, Uri > On Jan 5, 2022, at 07:05, Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Dear colleagues, > > OpenSSH uses SHA1 without any alternate options for hostname hashing (looks > like this is the last place where an alternate option for SHA1 is not > available). SHA1 HMAC is considered safe enough for now, but it may change > so it's definitely worth migrating to more safe algorithms (SHA2?). > > I'd like to discuss possible options of such migration. > > Many thanks! > -- > Dmitry Belyavskiy > _______________________________________________ > openssh-unix-dev mailing list > openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
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