On Sun, 4 Oct 2020 at 14:38, Christoph Anton Mitterer
<calestyo@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
[...]
> So even if the compromise is detected on the server side (and properly
> cleaned up) the may be countless of clients (which you can never reach
> all) who still have the compromised keys and may subsequently be
> vulnerable to MitM, since they'd still trust that the key authenticates
> server foo.bar.
How is that scenario any different from the attacker keeping a copy of
the compromised server's private keys, other than causing more
evidence to be created when the attacker's keys get sent out?
--
Darren Tucker (dtucker at dtucker.net)
GPG key 11EAA6FA / A86E 3E07 5B19 5880 E860 37F4 9357 ECEF 11EA A6FA (new)
Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience
usually comes from bad judgement.
_______________________________________________
openssh-unix-dev mailing list
openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
