Re: SSH certificates - restricting to host groups

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On 30/01/2020 16:48, Christian, Mark wrote:
> However, when alice is no longer authorized, and assuming her cert is
> still valid, you're going to want to use some configuration mgmt to
> manage RevokedKeys, otherwise ensure that alice's cert is valid for a
> short period of time.

Indeed: I was intending to use a cronjob to fetch a CRL, as suggested at

https://github.com/nsheridan/cashier#revoking-certificates


AllowGroups, AllowUsers in sshd_config.  /etc/security/access.conf or
equivalent.  These are the ways to limit access to systems where bob
and alice are not authorized.

So if I understand you correctly, you're saying "SSH certificates are not intended to be used to carry authorization information".

In general, there is a sound argument for keeping authentication separate from authorization.  On the other hand, it does make me wonder why there is support for multiple principals in one SSH certificate.

Regards,

Brian.

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