That doesn't seem to be the case. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf (5.6.1 Comparable Algorithm Strengths) On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 8:28 AM Darren Tucker <dtucker@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, 15 Feb 2019 at 16:00, Yegor Ievlev <koops1997@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > I don't think there is any point to generate so many moduli. Actually, > > 3 moduli of sizes 2048, 3072 and 4096 seem like a sane choice. > > NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, on which the current group size selection code > is based, puts a 4k group at a little over 128 bits of security. This > is why we generate larger groups (and request them, when using 192 and > 256 bit ciphers). > > -- > Darren Tucker (dtucker at dtucker.net) > GPG key 11EAA6FA / A86E 3E07 5B19 5880 E860 37F4 9357 ECEF 11EA A6FA (new) > Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience > usually comes from bad judgement. _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
