I concur with Nico – logging plaintext passwords is an extremely bad idea.
The tone of the poster also leaves much to be desired – but I’ll hold my tongue for now.
--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal
On 12/18/16, 11:48, "openssh-unix-dev on behalf of Nico Kadel-Garcia" <openssh-unix-dev-bounces+uri=ll.mit.edu@xxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of nkadel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 9:42 AM, Philipp Vlassakakis
<philipp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> What part of „Password Authentication is disabled“ do you not understand?
>
>
> Am 18.12.2016 um 11:21 schrieb Nico Kadel-Garcia <nkadel@xxxxxxxxx>:
>
> On Sat, Dec 17, 2016 at 7:37 PM, Philipp Vlassakakis
> <philipp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Dear list members,
>
> I want to extend the logging of the openssh-server, so it also logs the
> entered passwords in plaintext, and yes I know that this is a security
> issue, but relax, Password Authentication is disabled. ;)
>
>
> Oh, dear lord. What part of "a really bad idea and begging for pure
> abuse" is not clear about this idea? Simply setting up a fake server
> with a hostname similar to a common could encourage password
> harvesting.
>
> It would be much safer to simply avoid activating debugging tools that
> can be so abused.
What part of "actively supporting honeypots is a bad idea" is unclear
to you, sir? This kind of built-in feature can, and will, be used by
malicious people to activate passphrase theft. By activating it
directly in the source code, it also makes it that much more difficult
to detect when someone can and has enabled such harvesting.
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