Hey Damien, my special snowflake cert tests seem to work fine on osx sierra (OpenSSH_7.3p1-snap20161214, OpenSSL 1.0.2j 26 Sep 2016). thanks! On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Damien Miller <djm@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi, > > OpenSSH 7.4 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing > on as many platforms and systems as possible. This release contains some > substantial new features and a number of bugfixes. > > Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from > http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/ > > The OpenBSD version is available in CVS HEAD: > http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html > > Portable OpenSSH is also available via anonymous CVS using the > instructions at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html#cvs or > via Git at https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/ or via a > mirror at Github: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable > > Running the regression tests supplied with Portable OpenSSH does not > require installation and is a simply: > > $ ./configure && make tests > > Live testing on suitable non-production systems is also > appreciated. Please send reports of success or failure to > openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx. > > Below is a summary of changes. More detail may be found in the ChangeLog > in the portable OpenSSH tarballs. > > Thanks to the many people who contributed to this release. > > Potentially-incompatible changes > ================================ > > This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing > configurations: > > * This release removes server support for the SSH v.1 protocol. > > * ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal. 64-bit > block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until > attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH. As 3des-cbc was the > only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may cause problems > connecting to older devices using the default configuration, > but it's highly likely that such devices already need explicit > configuration for key exchange and hostkey algorithms already > anyway. > > * sshd(8): Remove support for pre-authentication compression. > Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable > in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both > cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and > attack surface. Pre-auth compression support has been disabled by > default for >10 years. Support remains in the client. > > * ssh-agent will refuse to load PKCS#11 modules outside a whitelist > of trusted paths by default. The path whitelist may be specified > at run-time. > > * sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and > an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd will now > refuse to accept the certificate unless they are identical. > The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate > forced-command override the other could be a bit confusing and > error-prone. > > * sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and support > for having /bin/login manage login sessions. > > Changes since OpenSSH 7.3 > ========================= > > This is primarily a bugfix release. > > New Features > ------------ > > * ssh(1): Add a proxy multiplexing mode to ssh(1) inspired by the > version in PuTTY by Simon Tatham. This allows a multiplexing > client to communicate with the master process using a subset of > the SSH packet and channels protocol over a Unix-domain socket, > with the main process acting as a proxy that translates channel > IDs, etc. This allows multiplexing mode to run on systems that > lack file- descriptor passing (used by current multiplexing > code) and potentially, in conjunction with Unix-domain socket > forwarding, with the client and multiplexing master process on > different machines. Multiplexing proxy mode may be invoked using > "ssh -O proxy ..." > > * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables > X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well > as anything else we might implement in the future. Like the > 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, this is intended to be a simple > and future-proof way of restricting an account. > > * sshd(8), ssh(1): Support the "curve25519-sha256" key exchange > method. This is identical to the currently-support method named > "curve25519-sha256@xxxxxxxxxx". > > * sshd(8): Improve handling of SIGHUP by checking to see if sshd is > already daemonised at startup and skipping the call to daemon(3) > if it is. This ensures that a SIGHUP restart of sshd(8) will > retain the same process-ID as the initial execution. sshd(8) will > also now unlink the PidFile prior to SIGHUP restart and re-create > it after a successful restart, rather than leaving a stale file in > the case of a configuration error. bz#2641 > > * sshd(8): Allow ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax > directives to appear in sshd_config Match blocks. > > * sshd(8): Add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match > those supported by AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, > fingerprint, etc.) and a few more to provide access to the > contents of the certificate being offered. > > * Added regression tests for string matching, address matching and > string sanitisation functions. > > * Improved the key exchange fuzzer harness. > > Bugfixes > -------- > > * ssh(1): Allow IdentityFile to successfully load and use > certificates that have no corresponding bare public key. bz#2617 > certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub). > > * ssh(1): Fix public key authentication when multiple > authentication is in use and publickey is not just the first > method attempted. bz#2642 > > * regress: Allow the PuTTY interop tests to run unattended. bz#2639 > > * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): improve reporting when attempting to load > keys from PKCS#11 tokens with fewer useless log messages and more > detail in debug messages. bz#2610 > > * ssh(1): When tearing down ControlMaster connections, don't > pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet. > > * sftp(1): On ^Z wait for underlying ssh(1) to suspend before > suspending sftp(1) to ensure that ssh(1) restores the terminal mode > correctly if suspended during a password prompt. > > * ssh(1): Avoid busy-wait when ssh(1) is suspended during a password > prompt. > > * ssh(1), sshd(8): Correctly report errors during sending of ext- > info messages. > > * sshd(8): fix NULL-deref crash if sshd(8) received an out-of- > sequence NEWKEYS message. > > * sshd(8): Correct list of supported signature algorithms sent in > the server-sig-algs extension. bz#2547 > > * sshd(8): Fix sending ext_info message if privsep is disabled. > > * sshd(8): more strictly enforce the expected ordering of privilege > separation monitor calls used for authentication and allow them > only when their respective authentication methods are enabled > in the configuration > > * sshd(8): Fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call; harmless > on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin. > > * Fix false positive reports caused by explicit_bzero(3) not being > recognised as a memory initialiser when compiled with > -fsanitize-memory. > > * sshd_config(5): Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet for > configuration examples. > > Portability > ----------- > > * On environments configured with Turkish locales, fall back to the > C/POSIX locale to avoid errors in configuration parsing caused by > that locale's unique handling of the letters 'i' and 'I'. bz#2643 > > * sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1): Deny ptrace on OS X using > ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..) > > * ssh(1), sshd(8): Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8) OpenSSL. > > * Fix compilation for libcrypto compiled without RIPEMD160 support. > > * contrib: Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 with GTK+3 support. bz#2640 > > * sshd(8): Improve PRNG reseeding across privilege separation and > force libcrypto to obtain a high-quality seed before chroot or > sandboxing. > > * All: Explicitly test for broken strnvis. NetBSD added an strnvis > and unfortunately made it incompatible with the existing one in > OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed for over ten > years). Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option > if we're cross compiling. > > > OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de > Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, > Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom. > > _______________________________________________ > openssh-unix-dev mailing list > openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
