Hi, I have tested the mitigation timing differences in password authentication (CVE-2016-6210). I have compiled openssh-SNAP-20160722.tar.gz in a Debian 8 and use my tool Osueta (https://github.com/c0r3dump3d/osueta) against the system. Ok, I have seen that you calculate all the password hash exist or not exist the user, and with this you can not discriminate the presence or absence of that user, but now it's more easy to establish the DOS condition in the access to the Openssh server and exhausting the CPU resources, any dummy user it can be used! For example: osueta -H 192.168.100.204 -U asdf -v no -d 15 -p 22 --dos yes -t 40 Users found Time delay in seconds -------------------------------------- asdf 27 I have attached screenshots with the CPU resource exhaustion and the DOS in the access to the Openssh server. The test machine it's a Debian 8 VM in KVM with 4 Core and 2GB of RAM. For CVE-2016-6210 user enumeration really it's mitigate but for the problem of DOS as I say seems much easier to exploit!! Regards. Andres Rojas http://www.devconsole.info El 22/07/16 a las 06:40, Damien Miller escribió: > Hi, > > OpenSSH 5.3 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing > on as many platforms and systems as possible. This release contains some > substantial new features and a number of bugfixes. > > Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from > http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/ > > The OpenBSD version is available in CVS HEAD: > http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html > > _______________________________________________ > openssh-unix-dev mailing list > openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev > _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
