On 17 June 2016 at 22:45, Nuno Gonçalves <nunojpg@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 7:57 PM, Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 17 June 2016 at 20:58, Nuno Gonçalves <nunojpg@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> It seems there is a bug with the pkcs11 feature where a zero-length >>> PIN is accepted. I believe this is a bug, since the user might want to >>> press return when asked for the PIN to ignore that slot/key. >> >> Hi, >> >> Empty PIN is valid case, not sure why you want to avoid supporting it. >> >> Alon > > I didn't know it was valid but the reasoning still applies. I don't > really know the standard use cases, but I think it could eventually be > useful for the user, when asked for the PIN, to decide not enter it. > Currently it can only be done by killing ssh. If empty PIN is valid, > but eventually not usual, maybe we should ask if the user really wants > to try a empty pin or just continue to another authentication option? Not sure what best solution, but ignoring empty PIN is the same as ignoring "cancel" or similar constants, which is more explicit. What's wrong with plain <Ctrl>-C, as without PIN there is no use to continue session anyway. > Regarding the CKF_USER_PIN flags, do you think it is a good idea to > implement the warning messages? Most implementations do not support these. Regards, Alon _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
