Re: 3des cipher and DH group size

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Am 04.02.2014 um 16:58 schrieb Hubert Kario <hkario@xxxxxxxxxx>:

> Continuing the discussion from https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-January/032037.html
> 
> I have looked at the changes made to implement automatic selection of DH
> groups and there are few changes confusing to me, to say the least.
> 
> Especially 1.97~1.96 rev diff of kex.c:
> 
>> +		 dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
> 
> Why "MAX("? Why security of chosen dh moduli should match the _most_
> secure primitive? Since DH KEX is computationally expensive (think smartphones),
> shouldn't we try to use as small DH parameters as possible?

I don’t understand your excitement.

I chose MAX() here, because the old release did the same.

The old release basically did
need = MAX(enckeylen, block size, ivlen, mackeylen)
and all I did was to replace enckeylen (192 bits for 3DES) with cipher_seclen (112 bits).

You might argue that the old code was wrong, but I chose a minimal change
to fall back to a conservative choice.

-m


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