The deal is that IP addresses are useless, host names are useful , but host name spoofing is actually a real thing that real attackers do. So, either you don't log, you log hacker controlled data, or you UseDNS. OpenSSH, optimizing for security, chooses the last of these options. On Thursday, December 26, 2013, Kaz Kylheku wrote: > > > On 26.12.2013 09:27, Alex Bligh wrote: > > > On 25 Dec 2013, at 08:04, Ben Lindstrom wrote: > > > >> UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name > and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back > to the very same IP address. The default is ``yes''. > > > > I've often wondered why the default for this is 'yes'. > > I don't want to read reference manuals. I want software not to do stupid > things by default. This misfeature and its configuration option > shouldn't even exist. > > There isn't any action that the software can take based on this info. > (We should never waste resources gathering info that cannot be used to > take action.) > > You cannot reject hosts from making SSH connections just because they > have inconsistent DNS. > > Such checks are sometimes useful in software that has no real security, > like SMTP. Rejecting inconsistent DNS hosts is an amazingly reliable > rule that will get rid of a large fraction of spam, with virtually no > false positives. > > > _______________________________________________ > openssh-unix-dev mailing list > openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org <javascript:;> > https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev >
