sandbox-rlimit and ptrace.

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On Sat, Dec 21, 2013 at 07:54:02AM +1100, Damien Miller wrote:
> On Fri, 20 Dec 2013, Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote:
> 
> > I was wondering if the following attack would be feasible once I'm able
> > to break into rlimit sandbox.
> > 
> > Because sandboxed process that handles unauthenticated session is
> > running as the 'sshd' user I was wondering if this could be used to jump
> > between processes using ptrace(2). For example if I find a bug in the
> > code executed before authentication I could use ptrace(2) to attach to
> > another unprivileged processes running with the same credentials as I
> > am. If I understand correctly this sandbox process is responsible for
> > extracting credentials of the connecting user from the protocol, which
> > means if I attach to a process handling root loggining in with a
> > password I could obtain root's password.
> > 
> > Can someone confirm or tell me what am I missing?
> 
> It shouldn't be possible because the child process has a setuid in its
> history and this should deny ptrace of the process by any user but root.

Indeed, thanks.

-- 
Pawel Jakub Dawidek                       http://www.wheelsystems.com
FreeBSD committer                         http://www.FreeBSD.org
Am I Evil? Yes, I Am!                     http://mobter.com
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