In the view of the recent NSA wiretappings, I reviewed some security related parameters of openconnect. My proposed patches enhance protection against passive eavesdroppers and all known active attacks on TLS hopefully without harming compatibility. * 0001-Enable-a-padding-when-sending-password-to-avoid-leak.patch: With this patch the authentication session over TLS no longer leaks the length of the password (gnutls uses random padding per record but this is disabled with the %COMPAT keyword). * 0002-Added-pfs-option-to-force-perfect-forward-secrecy.patch: Forces perfect forward secrecy. That way a leak of the server key will not lead to decryption of all past sessions with this server (it may be that a server doesn't support PFS, so it is not set by default). * 0003-When-selecting-TLS-protocol-options-for-GnuTLS-set-t.patch: Removes some protocol weakening options for gnutls. For some reason these options were only set when using gnutls and not openssl, so I don't think it is of any benefit keeping them. regards, Nikos -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0001-Enable-a-padding-when-sending-password-to-avoid-leak.patch Type: text/x-patch Size: 1333 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/openconnect-devel/attachments/20130627/0d030a04/attachment.bin> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0002-Added-pfs-option-to-force-perfect-forward-secrecy.patch Type: text/x-patch Size: 3886 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/openconnect-devel/attachments/20130627/0d030a04/attachment-0001.bin> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0003-When-selecting-TLS-protocol-options-for-GnuTLS-set-t.patch Type: text/x-patch Size: 1352 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/openconnect-devel/attachments/20130627/0d030a04/attachment-0002.bin>
