Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] landlock: TCP network hooks implementation

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2/7/2022 7:17 PM, Willem de Bruijn пишет:
   If bind() function has already been restricted so the following
listen() function is automatically banned. I agree with Mickaёl about
the usecase here. Why do we need new-bound socket with restricted listening?

The intended use-case is for a privileged process to open a connection
(i.e., bound and connected socket) and pass that to a restricted
process. The intent is for that process to only be allowed to
communicate over this pre-established channel.

In practice, it is able to disconnect (while staying bound) and
elevate its privileges to that of a listening server:

static void child_process(int fd)
{
         struct sockaddr addr = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
         int client_fd;

         if (listen(fd, 1) == 0)
                 error(1, 0, "listen succeeded while connected");

         if (connect(fd, &addr, sizeof(addr)))
                 error(1, errno, "disconnect");

         if (listen(fd, 1))
                 error(1, errno, "listen");

         client_fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
         if (client_fd == -1)
                 error(1, errno, "accept");

         if (close(client_fd))
                 error(1, errno, "close client");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
         struct sockaddr_in6 addr = { 0 };
         pid_t pid;
         int fd;

         fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
         if (fd == -1)
                 error(1, errno, "socket");

         addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
         addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;

         addr.sin6_port = htons(8001);
         if (bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)))
                 error(1, errno, "bind");

         addr.sin6_port = htons(8000);
         if (connect(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)))
                 error(1, errno, "connect");

         pid = fork();
         if (pid == -1)
                 error(1, errno, "fork");

         if (pid)
                 wait(NULL);
         else
                 child_process(fd);

         if (close(fd))
                 error(1, errno, "close");

         return 0;
}

It's fine to not address this case in this patch series directly, of
course. But we should be aware of the AF_UNSPEC loophole.

I did just notice that with autobind (i.e., without the explicit call
to bind), the socket gets a different local port after listen. So
internally a bind call may be made, which may or may not be correctly
handled by the current landlock implementation already:

  Thanks again. I will check it out.

+static void show_local_port(int fd)
+{
+       char addr_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+       struct sockaddr_in6 addr = { 0 };
+       socklen_t alen;
+
+       alen = sizeof(addr);
+       if (getsockname(fd, (void *)&addr, &alen))
+               error(1, errno, "getsockname");
+
+       if (addr.sin6_family != AF_INET6)
+               error(1, 0, "getsockname: family");
+
+       if (!inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addr.sin6_addr, addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)))
+               error(1, errno, "inet_ntop");
+       fprintf(stderr, "server: %s:%hu\n", addr_str, ntohs(addr.sin6_port));
+
+}
+
@@ -23,6 +42,8 @@ static void child_process(int fd)
         if (connect(fd, &addr, sizeof(addr)))
                 error(1, errno, "disconnect");

+       show_local_port(fd);
+
         if (listen(fd, 1))
                 error(1, errno, "listen");

+       show_local_port(fd);
+

@@ -47,10 +68,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
         addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;

-       addr.sin6_port = htons(8001);
-       if (bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)))
-               error(1, errno, "bind");
-
         addr.sin6_port = htons(8000);
         if (connect(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)))
                 error(1, errno, "connect");
.



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