Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] landlock: selftests for bind and connect hooks

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2/1/2022 9:31 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:

On 24/01/2022 09:02, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
Support 4 tests for bind and connect networks actions:

Good to see such tests!


1. bind() a socket with no landlock restrictions.
2. bind() sockets with landllock restrictions.

You can leverage the FIXTURE_VARIANT helpers to factor out this kind of tests (see ptrace_test.c).

 Thanks. I will check this out.


3. connect() a socket to listening one with no landlock restricitons.
4. connect() sockets with landlock restrictions.

Same here, you can factor out code. I guess you could create helpers for client and server parts.

  Ok. I got it.

We also need to test with IPv4, IPv6 and the AF_UNSPEC tricks.

  Yep. I will add AF_UNSPEC case.

Please provide the kernel test coverage and explain why the uncovered code cannot be covered: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/gcov.html

  Thanks for the link. I will check it out.

You'll probably see that there are a multiple parts of the kernel that are not covered. For instance, it is important to test different combinations of layered network rules (see layout1/ruleset_overlap, layer_rule_unions, non_overlapping_accesses, interleaved_masked_accesses… in fs_test.c). Tests in fs_test.c are more complex because handling file system rules is more complex, but you can get some inspiration in it, especially the edge cases.

  I got your point. I agree that we need to cover as many network rules
  combinations as possible.

We also need to test invalid user space supplied data (see layout1/inval test in fs_test.c).

  Ok. I will add this kind of test. Thanks.



Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  .../testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c | 346 ++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 346 insertions(+)
  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9dfe37a2fb20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - Common user space base
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI

You need to update this header with an appropriate description and the copyright holder (your employer).

  Ok. I got it.

+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>

To make it determinisitic (and ease patching/diff/merging), you should sort all the included files (in tests and in the kernel code).

  Sorry. Did not get your point here. Could you explain in a bit more
  details please.


+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#define SOCK_PORT_1 3470
+#define SOCK_PORT_2 3480
+#define SOCK_PORT_3 3490

To avoid port collision and create a clean and stable test environement (to avoid flaky tests), you should create a network namespace with FIXTURE_SETUP, test with TEST_F_FORK (to not polute the parent process, and which works with test variants), and use the set_cap and clear_cap helpers (see fs_test.c).

  Ok. I got it.


+
+#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1"
+
+/* Number pending connections queue tobe hold */
+#define BACKLOG 10
+
+TEST(socket_bind_no_restrictions) {
+
+    int sockfd;
+    struct sockaddr_in addr;
+    const int one = 1;
+
+    /* Create a socket */
+    sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));

With a dedicated namespace, SO_REUSEADDR should not be required.

  Yes. I agree. Will be refactored.


+
+    /* Set socket address parameters */
+    addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_1);
+    addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+    /* Bind the socket to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)));
+}
+
+TEST(sockets_bind_with_restrictions) {
+
+    int sockfd_1, sockfd_2, sockfd_3;
+    struct sockaddr_in addr_1, addr_2, addr_3;
+    const int one = 1;
+
+    struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+        .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+                      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+    };
+    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+        .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+                  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+        .port = SOCK_PORT_1,
+    };
+    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+        .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+        .port = SOCK_PORT_2,
+    };
+    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+        .allowed_access = 0,
+        .port = SOCK_PORT_3,
+    };

Good to have these three different rules!


+
+    const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+            sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+    /* Allow connect and bind operations to the SOCK_PORT_1 socket "object" */

You can omit "object" but use full sentences at the third person (because it explains what do the next lines).

  Ok. I got it.


+    ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+                &net_service_1, 0));
+    /* Allow connect and deny bind operations to the SOCK_PORT_2 socket "object" */ +    ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+                &net_service_2, 0));
+    /* Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in network actions
+     * for SOCK_PORT_3 socket "object"
+     */
+    ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+                &net_service_3, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+    /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+    /* Create a socket 1 */
+    sockfd_1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);

Please create all FD with SOCK_CLOEXEC and also close them when not needed. This could also reduce the number of FD.

  Ok. Thanks for noticing. It makes sense.


+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));
+
+    /* Set socket 1 address parameters */
+    addr_1.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr_1.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_1);
+    addr_1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr_1.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+    /* Bind the socket 1 to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr  *)&addr_1, sizeof(addr_1)));
+
+    /* Create a socket 2 */
+    sockfd_2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));
+
+    /* Set socket 2 address parameters */
+    addr_2.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr_2.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_2);
+    addr_2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr_2.sin_zero), '\0', 8);

These part could be factored out with helpers or/and test variants.

  Thanks. Will be factored out.


+    /* Bind the socket 2 to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind(sockfd_2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_2, sizeof(addr_2)));
+    ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+    /* Create a socket 3 */
+    sockfd_3 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_3);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));
+
+    /* Set socket 3 address parameters */
+    addr_3.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr_3.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_3);
+    addr_3.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr_3.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+    /* Bind the socket 3 to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_3, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_3, sizeof(addr_3)));

Why is it allowed to bind to SOCK_PORT_3 whereas net_service_3 forbids it?

  It's allowed cause net_service_3 has empty access field.

   /* Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in network
    *  actions for SOCK_PORT_3 socket "object"
    */
    ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
                                    LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
                                    &net_service_3, 0));
    ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);

  Applying this rule returns ENOMSG errno:

  /* Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
   * are ignored in network actions
   */
		if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) {
			err = -ENOMSG;
			goto out_put_ruleset;
		}
  This means binding socket 3 is not restricted.
  For path_beneath_attr.allowed_access = 0 there is the same logic.


+}
+
+TEST(socket_connect_no_restrictions) {
+
+    int sockfd, new_fd;
+    struct sockaddr_in addr;
+    pid_t child;
+    int status;
+    const int one = 1;
+
+    /* Create a server socket */
+    sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));
+
+    /* Set socket address parameters */
+    addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_1);
+    addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+    /* Bind the socket to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)));
+
+    /* Make listening socket */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(sockfd, BACKLOG));
+
+    child = fork();
+    ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+    if (child == 0) {
+        int child_sockfd;
+        struct sockaddr_in connect_addr;
+
+        /* Close listening socket for the child */
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+        /* Create a stream client socket */
+        child_sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+        ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+        /* Set server's socket address parameters*/
+        connect_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+        connect_addr.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_1);
+        connect_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+        memset(&(connect_addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+        /* Make connection to the listening socket */
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+                       sizeof(struct sockaddr)));
+        _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+        return;
+    }
+    /* Accept connection from the child */
+    new_fd = accept(sockfd, NULL, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
+
+    /* Close connection */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+    ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST(sockets_connect_with_restrictions) {
+
+    int new_fd;
+    int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+    struct sockaddr_in addr_1, addr_2;
+    pid_t child_1, child_2;
+    int status;
+    const int one = 1;
+
+    struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+        .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+                      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+    };
+    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+        .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+                  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+        .port = SOCK_PORT_1,
+    };
+    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+        .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+        .port = SOCK_PORT_2,
+    };
+
+    const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+            sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+    /* Allow connect and bind operations to the SOCK_PORT_1 socket "object" */ +    ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+                &net_service_1, 0));
+    /* Allow connect and deny bind operations to the SOCK_PORT_2 socket "object" */ +    ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+                &net_service_2, 0));
+
+    /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+    /* Create a server socket 1 */
+    sockfd_1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));
+
+    /* Set socket 1 address parameters */
+    addr_1.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr_1.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_1);
+    addr_1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr_1.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+    /* Bind the socket 1 to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_1, sizeof(addr_1)));
+
+    /* Make listening socket 1 */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(sockfd_1, BACKLOG));
+
+    child_1 = fork();
+    ASSERT_LE(0, child_1);
+    if (child_1 == 0) {
+        int child_sockfd;
+        struct sockaddr_in connect_addr;
+
+        /* Close listening socket for the child */
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+        /* Create a stream client socket */
+        child_sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+        ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+        /* Set server's socket 1 address parameters*/
+        connect_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+        connect_addr.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_1);
+        connect_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+        memset(&(connect_addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+        /* Make connection to the listening socket 1 */
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+                       sizeof(struct sockaddr)));
+        _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+        return;
+    }
+    /* Accept connection from the child 1 */
+    new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
+
+    /* Close connection */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(child_1, waitpid(child_1, &status, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+    ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+    /* Create a server socket 2 */
+    sockfd_2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+    /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)));
+
+    /* Set socket 2 address parameters */
+    addr_2.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    addr_2.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_2);
+    addr_2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+    memset(&(addr_2.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+    /* Bind the socket 2 to IP address */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_2, sizeof(addr_2)));
+
+    /* Make listening socket 2 */
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(sockfd_2, BACKLOG));
+
+    child_2 = fork();
+    ASSERT_LE(0, child_2);
+    if (child_2 == 0) {
+        int child_sockfd;
+        struct sockaddr_in connect_addr;
+
+        /* Close listening socket for the child */
+        ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+        /* Create a stream client socket */
+        child_sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+        ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+        /* Set server's socket address parameters*/
+        connect_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+        connect_addr.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_2);
+        connect_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+        memset(&(connect_addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+        /* Make connection to the listening socket */
+        ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+                       sizeof(struct sockaddr)));
+        ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+        _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(child_2, waitpid(child_2, &status, 0));
+    ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+    ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
.



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