Re: Filtering in PREROUTING

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george wrote:
- broadcasts, mostly from Windows boxes which include Grant's netbeui
example.  These are most frequent and were the trigger for doing this.

Remember that not all NetBEUI traffic is a broadcast. In fact, the only thing that is a broadcast is traffic looking for other hosts (if you are not using NetBIOS Name Server (a.k.a. WINS)) or messages that are meant to be broadcast messages to user / computers / domains, i.e. "The server is going down for maintenance." messages.

- spoofed source address (I don't know if I really need these with
rp-filter enabled, in particular to catch private addresses if they
manage to get in from the Internet.  I may be being too paranoid here)

RP filter can detect spoofed source traffic from your internal network subnet, but not the internet at large.

These all look good to me.  I haven't needed NOTRACK before so I'd have
to get that bit straight in my head if I were to go that way.

To my knowledge, NOTRACK is really just used to tell the connection tracking system to not track a packet. There is not really a lot of use for this in most installs. There are only two things that come to mind where you would not want / need this. 1) If you were using TARPIT and did not want to tie up CTState table entries. 2) If you were doing some sort of really high traffic for specific services and did not want that service to be connection tracked.

I'm still not sure that I'm doing anything wrong, just unconventional.

I will agree with and not argue with that statement.

From what I've been told via this list I'm thinking that it would be
sensible to move my broadcast dropping to raw, state checks to filter
and I don't know if I even need the spoofing checks, but if I do I
suspect raw is the place for them.

In accordance with your above statement, I will say that (IMHO) the filter table is better, but raw is not wrong.

I am still slightly nervous that by going against the designers'
intentions I might end up with something breaking.  I would hope that
anything dangerous wouldn't be allowed but "of course I didn't check for
that - nobody would do that would they" is a classic reaon for software
flaws :)

Well I don't *think* / believe you will run in to any bugs that will break things short of a bug in a specific match (extension). As I understand it, most pieces of NetFilter are small modules that just check their small data set and return a value. IPTables it self calls small tests in combination with each other and deciding what to do based on the return value from the small tests. Note, this is what I have derived being a NetFilter / IPTables user, not from a developers standpoint.



Grant. . . .



Grant. . . .


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