On Wed, Nov 13, 2024 at 12:04:05PM +0100, Florian Westphal wrote: > Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > I'm making another pass on this series, a few thing I would like to > > ask, see below. > > > > On Thu, Nov 07, 2024 at 06:44:08PM +0100, Florian Westphal wrote: > > > diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c > > > index bdf5ba21c76d..e96e538fe2eb 100644 > > > --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c > > > +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c > > > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ > > > > > > #define NFT_MODULE_AUTOLOAD_LIMIT (MODULE_NAME_LEN - sizeof("nft-expr-255-")) > > > #define NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN 16 > > > +#define NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS ((2048 - sizeof(struct nft_trans_elem)) / sizeof(struct nft_trans_one_elem)) > > > > This NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS is to stay in a specific kmalloc-X? > > > > What is the logic behind this NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS? > > I want to avoid making huge kmalloc requests, plus avoid huge krealloc > overhead. > > I think that kmalloc-2048 slab is a good fit. > I can add a comment, or increase to kmalloc-4096 but I'd prefer to > not go over that, since kmalloc allocations > 1 page are more prone > to allocation failure. Makes sense as it is now, thanks for explaining. > > > unsigned int nf_tables_net_id __read_mostly; > > > > > > @@ -391,6 +392,69 @@ static void nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net, > > > return __nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain, false); > > > } > > > > > > +static bool nft_trans_collapse_set_elem_allowed(const struct nft_trans_elem *a, const struct nft_trans_elem *b) > > > +{ > > > + return a->set == b->set && a->bound == b->bound && a->nelems < NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS; > > > > I think this a->bound == b->bound check defensive. > > > > This code is collapsing only two consecutive transactions, the one at > > the tail (where nelems > 1) and the new transaction (where nelems == > > 1). > > Yes. > > > bound state should only change in case there is a NEWRULE transaction > > in between. > > Yes. > > > I am trying to find a error scenario where a->bound == b->bound > > evaluates false. I considered the following: > > > > newelem -> newrule -> newelem > > > > where newrule has these expressions: > > > > lookup -> error > > > > in this case, newrule error path is exercised: > > > > nft_rule_expr_deactivate(&ctx, rule, NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR); > > > > this calls nf_tables_deactivate_set() that calls > > nft_set_trans_unbind(), then a->bound is restored to false. Rule is > > released and no transaction is added. > > > > Because if this succeeds: > > > > newelem -> newrule -> newelem > > > > then no element collapsing can happen, because we only collapse what > > is at the tail. > > > > TLDR; Check does not harm, but it looks unlikely to happen to me. > > Yes, its defensive check. I could add a comment. Please, do it so we don't forget about this subtle detail. > The WARN_ON_ONCE for trans->nelems != 1 exists for same reason. Right. > > > +} > > > + > > > +static bool nft_trans_collapse_set_elem(struct nftables_pernet *nft_net, > > > + struct nft_trans_elem *tail, > > > + struct nft_trans_elem *trans, > > > + gfp_t gfp) > > > +{ > > > + unsigned int nelems, old_nelems = tail->nelems; > > > + struct nft_trans_elem *new_trans; > > > + > > > + if (!nft_trans_collapse_set_elem_allowed(tail, trans)) > > > + return false; > > > + > > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(trans->nelems != 1)) > > > + return false; > > > + > > > + if (check_add_overflow(old_nelems, trans->nelems, &nelems)) > > > + return false; > > > + > > > + /* krealloc might free tail which invalidates list pointers */ > > > + list_del_init(&tail->nft_trans.list); > > > + > > > + new_trans = krealloc(tail, struct_size(tail, elems, nelems), gfp); > > > + if (!new_trans) { > > > + list_add_tail(&tail->nft_trans.list, &nft_net->commit_list); > > > + return false; > > > + } > > > + > > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_trans->nft_trans.list); > > > > This initialization is also defensive, this element is added via > > list_add_tail(). > > Yes, the first arg to list_add(_tail) can live without initialisation. Let's remove it then. Would you submit a new revision with all these little nitpicks? Then you also have a chance to edit your explaination on the audit aspect of this series. If you are busy with other stuff I can take a look here, just let me know. Thanks.