Hello!
Just a few wording nits and a remark on using maybe u8, u16, u32.
On Wed, Sep 04, 2024 at 06:48:06PM +0800, Mikhail Ivanov wrote:
> Landlock implements the `LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT` rule type, which provides
> fine-grained control of actions for a specific protocol. Any action or
> protocol that is not supported by this rule can not be controlled. As a
> result, protocols for which fine-grained control is not supported can be
> used in a sandboxed system and lead to vulnerabilities or unexpected
> behavior.
>
> Controlling the protocols used will allow to use only those that are
> necessary for the system and/or which have fine-grained Landlock control
> through others types of rules (e.g. TCP bind/connect control with
> `LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT`, UNIX bind control with
> `LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH`). Consider following examples:
>
> * Server may want to use only TCP sockets for which there is fine-grained
> control of bind(2) and connect(2) actions [1].
> * System that does not need a network or that may want to disable network
> for security reasons (e.g. [2]) can achieve this by restricting the use
> of all possible protocols.
>
> This patch implements such control by restricting socket creation in a
> sandboxed process.
>
> Add `LANDLOCK_RULE_SOCKET` rule type that restricts actions on sockets.
> This rule uses values of address family and socket type (Cf. socket(2))
> to determine sockets that should be restricted. This is represented in a
> landlock_socket_attr struct:
>
> struct landlock_socket_attr {
> __u64 allowed_access;
> int family; /* same as domain in socket(2) */
> int type; /* see socket(2) */
> };
>
> Support socket rule storage in landlock ruleset.
>
> Add `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE` access right that corresponds to the
> creation of user space sockets. In the case of connection-based socket
> types, this does not restrict the actions that result in creation of
> sockets used for messaging between already existing endpoints
> (e.g. accept(2), SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF). Also, this does not restrict any
> other socket-related actions such as bind(2) or send(2). All restricted
> actions are enlisted in the documentation of this access right.
>
> As with all other access rights, using `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE`
> does not affect the actions on sockets which were created before
> sandboxing.
>
> Add socket.c file that will contain socket rules management and hooks.
>
> Implement helper pack_socket_key() to convert 32-bit family and type
> alues into uintptr_t. This is possible due to the fact that these
^^^^^
values
> values are limited to AF_MAX (=46), SOCK_MAX (=11) constants. Assumption
> is checked in build-time by the helper.
>
> Support socket rules in landlock syscalls. Change ABI version to 6.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZJvy2SViorgc+cZI@xxxxxxxxxx/
> [2] https://cr.yp.to/unix/disablenetwork.html
>
> Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/6
> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Changes since v2:
> * Refactors access_mask for `LANDLOCK_RULE_SOCKET`.
> * Changes type of 'socket_key.packed' from 'uintptr_t' to 'unsigned int'
> in order to fix UB in pack_socket_key().
> * Accepts (AF_INET, SOCK_PACKET) as an alias for (AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET)
> in landlock_append_socket_rule().
> * Fixes documentation.
> * Rewrites commit message.
> * Fixes grammar.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v1:
> * Reverts landlock_key.data type from u64 to uinptr_t.
> * Adds helper to pack domain and type values into uintptr_t.
> * Denies inserting socket rule with invalid family and type.
> * Renames 'domain' to 'family' in landlock_socket_attr.
> * Updates ABI version to 6 since ioctl patches changed it to 5.
> * Formats code with clang-format.
> * Minor fixes.
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 61 ++++++++++++++++-
> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +-
> security/landlock/limits.h | 4 ++
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 33 +++++++++-
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 45 ++++++++++++-
> security/landlock/socket.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++
> security/landlock/socket.h | 17 +++++
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++--
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 287 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/socket.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/socket.h
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 2c8dbc74b955..d9da9f2c0640 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -44,6 +44,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
> * flags`_).
> */
> __u64 handled_access_net;
> +
> + /**
> + * @handled_access_socket: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Socket flags`_)
> + * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no
> + * rule explicitly allow them.
> + */
> + __u64 handled_access_socket;
> };
>
> /*
> @@ -72,6 +79,11 @@ enum landlock_rule_type {
> * landlock_net_port_attr .
> */
> LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
> + /**
> + * @LANDLOCK_RULE_SOCKET: Type of a &struct
> + * landlock_socket_attr .
> + */
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_SOCKET,
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -123,6 +135,32 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
> __u64 port;
> };
>
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_socket_attr - Socket definition
> + *
> + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
> + */
> +struct landlock_socket_attr {
> + /**
> + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed access for a socket
> + * (cf. `Socket flags`_).
> + */
> + __u64 allowed_access;
> + /**
> + * @family: Protocol family used for communication
> + * (same as domain in socket(2)).
> + *
> + * This argument is considered valid if it is in the range [0, AF_MAX).
> + */
> + int family;
> + /**
> + * @type: Socket type (see socket(2)).
> + *
> + * This argument is considered valid if it is in the range [0, SOCK_MAX).
> + */
> + int type;
> +};
> +
> /**
> * DOC: fs_access
> *
> @@ -259,7 +297,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
> * DOC: net_access
> *
> * Network flags
> - * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> *
> * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network
> * actions. This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4.
> @@ -274,4 +312,25 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
> /* clang-format on */
> +
> +/**
> + * DOC: socket_access
> + *
> + * Socket flags
> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~
> + *
> + * These flags restrict actions on sockets for a sandboxed process (e.g. socket
> + * creation). Sockets opened before sandboxing are not subject to these
> + * restrictions. This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 6.
> + *
> + * The following access right apply only to sockets:
^^^^^
applies
> + *
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE: Create an user space socket. This access
^^
a
> + * right restricts following operations:
^ ...*the* following operations:
> + * * :manpage:`socket(2)`, :manpage:`socketpair(2)`,
> + * * ``IORING_OP_SOCKET`` io_uring operation (see :manpage:`io_uring_enter(2)`),
> + */
> +/* clang-format off */
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE (1ULL << 0)
> +/* clang-format on */
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
> index b4538b7cf7d2..ff1dd98f6a1b 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile
> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
> @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
>
> landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
> - cred.o task.o fs.o
> + cred.o task.o fs.o socket.o
>
> landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
> diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
> index 4eb643077a2a..2c04dca414c7 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/limits.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
> #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
> #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
>
> +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_SOCKET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE
> +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_SOCKET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_SOCKET << 1) - 1)
> +#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_SOCKET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_SOCKET)
> +
> /* clang-format on */
>
> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> index 6ff232f58618..9bf5e5e88544 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> + new_ruleset->root_socket = RB_ROOT;
>
> new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
> /*
> @@ -52,12 +53,13 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
>
> struct landlock_ruleset *
> landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
> - const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
> + const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
> + const access_mask_t socket_access_mask)
> {
> struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
>
> /* Informs about useless ruleset. */
> - if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
> + if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask && !socket_access_mask)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
> new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
> if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
> @@ -66,6 +68,9 @@ landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
> landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
> if (net_access_mask)
> landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
> + if (socket_access_mask)
> + landlock_add_socket_access_mask(new_ruleset, socket_access_mask,
> + 0);
> return new_ruleset;
> }
>
> @@ -89,6 +94,9 @@ static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
> return false;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET:
> + return false;
> +
> default:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> return false;
> @@ -146,6 +154,9 @@ static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> return &ruleset->root_net_port;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET:
> + return &ruleset->root_socket;
> +
> default:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> @@ -395,6 +406,11 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> goto out_unlock;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + /* Merges the @src socket tree. */
> + err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> out_unlock:
> mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
> mutex_unlock(&dst->lock);
> @@ -458,6 +474,11 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
> goto out_unlock;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + /* Copies the @parent socket tree. */
> + err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> goto out_unlock;
> @@ -494,6 +515,10 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
> free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next,
> + &ruleset->root_socket, node)
> + free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET);
> +
> put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
> kfree(ruleset);
> }
> @@ -704,6 +729,10 @@ landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> break;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET:
> + get_access_mask = landlock_get_socket_access_mask;
> + num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_SOCKET;
> + break;
> default:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> index 0f1b5b4c8f6b..5cf7251e11ca 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
> struct access_masks {
> access_mask_t fs : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
> access_mask_t net : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
> + access_mask_t socket : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_SOCKET;
> };
>
> typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
> @@ -92,6 +93,12 @@ enum landlock_key_type {
> * node keys.
> */
> LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
> +
> + /**
> + * @LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_socket's
> + * node keys.
> + */
> + LANDLOCK_KEY_SOCKET,
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -177,6 +184,15 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
> struct rb_root root_net_port;
> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>
> + /**
> + * @root_socket: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
> + * landlock_rule nodes with socket type, described by (family, type)
> + * pair (see socket(2)). Once a ruleset is tied to a
> + * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
> + * reaches zero.
> + */
> + struct rb_root root_socket;
> +
> /**
> * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent
> * domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection.
> @@ -215,8 +231,10 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
> */
> u32 num_layers;
> /**
> - * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem and
> - * network actions that are restricted by a ruleset.
> + * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem,
> + * network and socket actions that are restricted by
> + * a ruleset.
> + *
> * A domain saves all layers of merged rulesets in a
> * stack (FAM), starting from the first layer to the
> * last one. These layers are used when merging
> @@ -233,7 +251,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
>
> struct landlock_ruleset *
> landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
> - const access_mask_t access_mask_net);
> + const access_mask_t access_mask_net,
> + const access_mask_t access_mask_socket);
>
> void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
> void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
> @@ -280,6 +299,19 @@ landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net |= net_mask;
> }
>
> +static inline void
> +landlock_add_socket_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const access_mask_t socket_access_mask,
> + const u16 layer_level)
> +{
> + access_mask_t socket_mask = socket_access_mask &
> + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_SOCKET;
> +
> + /* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(socket_access_mask != socket_mask);
> + ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].socket |= socket_mask;
> +}
> +
> static inline access_mask_t
> landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> const u16 layer_level)
> @@ -303,6 +335,13 @@ landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net;
> }
>
> +static inline access_mask_t
> +landlock_get_socket_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const u16 layer_level)
> +{
> + return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].socket;
> +}
> +
> bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
> const access_mask_t access_request,
> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
> diff --git a/security/landlock/socket.c b/security/landlock/socket.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..cad89bb91678
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/socket.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Socket management and hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2024 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/net.h>
> +#include <linux/socket.h>
> +#include <linux/stddef.h>
> +
> +#include "limits.h"
> +#include "ruleset.h"
> +#include "socket.h"
> +
> +static uintptr_t pack_socket_key(const int family, const int type)
> +{
> + union {
> + struct {
> + unsigned short family, type;
> + } __packed data;
> + unsigned int packed;
> + } socket_key;
Maybe a slightly more obvious way would be to use the u8, u16 and u32 types
here? Then it would be more directly visible that we have considered this
correctly and that not one of the variables has an odd size on an obscure
platform somewhere.
> +
> + /*
> + * Checks that all supported socket families and types can be stored
> + * in socket_key.
> + */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(AF_MAX >= (typeof(socket_key.data.family))~0);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(SOCK_MAX >= (typeof(socket_key.data.type))~0);
> +
> + /* Checks that socket_key can be stored in landlock_key. */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(socket_key.data) > sizeof(socket_key.packed));
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(socket_key.packed) >
> + sizeof_field(union landlock_key, data));
> +
> + socket_key.data.family = (unsigned short)family;
> + socket_key.data.type = (unsigned short)type;
> +
> + return socket_key.packed;
> +}
—Günther
