On Thu, Aug 01, 2024 at 10:52:25AM +0300, Mikhail Ivanov wrote: > 7/31/2024 9:30 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On Sun, Jul 28, 2024 at 08:25:55AM +0800, Mikhail Ivanov wrote: > > > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP is useful to limit the scope of "bindable" > > > ports to forbid a malicious sandboxed process to impersonate a legitimate > > > server process. However, bind(2) might be used by (TCP) clients to set the > > > source port to a (legitimate) value. Controlling the ports that can be > > > used for listening would allow (TCP) clients to explicitly bind to ports > > > that are forbidden for listening. > > > > > > Such control is implemented with a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP > > > access right that restricts listening on undesired ports with listen(2). > > > > > > It's worth noticing that this access right doesn't affect changing > > > backlog value using listen(2) on already listening socket. > > > > > > * Create new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP flag. > > > * Add hook to socket_listen(), which checks whether the socket is allowed > > > to listen on a binded local port. > > > * Add check_tcp_socket_can_listen() helper, which validates socket > > > attributes before the actual access right check. > > > * Update `struct landlock_net_port_attr` documentation with control of > > > binding to ephemeral port with listen(2) description. > > > * Change ABI version to 6. > > > > > > Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/15 > > > Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Thanks for this series! > > > > I cannot apply this patch series though, could you please provide the > > base commit? BTW, this can be automatically put in the cover letter > > with the git format-patch's --base argument. > > base-commit: 591561c2b47b7e7225e229e844f5de75ce0c09ec Thanks, the following commit makes this series to not apply. > > Günther said that I should rebase to the latest commits, so I'll do > it in the next version of this patchset. Yep, currently we're on v6.11-rc1, but please specify the base commit each time. > > > > > > --- > > > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 23 +++-- > > > security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- > > > security/landlock/net.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++ > > > security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- > > > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- > > > 5 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > > > index 68625e728f43..6b8df3293eee 100644 > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > > > @@ -104,13 +104,16 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { > > > /** > > > * @port: Network port in host endianness. > > > * > > > - * It should be noted that port 0 passed to :manpage:`bind(2)` will > > > - * bind to an available port from a specific port range. This can be > > > - * configured thanks to the ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` > > > - * sysctl (also used for IPv6). A Landlock rule with port 0 and the > > > - * ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` right means that requesting to bind > > > - * on port 0 is allowed and it will automatically translate to binding > > > - * on the related port range. > > > + * It should be noted that some operations cause binding socket to a random > > > + * available port from a specific port range. This can be configured thanks > > > + * to the ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` sysctl (also used for > > > + * IPv6). Following operation requests are automatically translate to > > > + * binding on the related port range: > > > + * > > > + * - A Landlock rule with port 0 and the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` > > > + * right means that binding on port 0 is allowed. > > > + * - A Landlock rule with port 0 and the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP`` > > > + * right means listening without an explicit binding is allowed. > > > */ > > > __u64 port; > > > }; > > > @@ -251,7 +254,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { > > > * DOC: net_access > > > * > > > * Network flags > > > - * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > * > > > * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network > > > * actions. This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4. > > > @@ -261,9 +264,13 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { > > > * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP: Bind a TCP socket to a local port. > > > * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect an active TCP socket to > > > * a remote port. > > > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP: Listen for TCP socket connections on > > > + * a local port. This access right is available since the sixth version > > > + * of the Landlock ABI. > > > */ > > > /* clang-format off */ > > > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) > > > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) > > > +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP (1ULL << 2) > > > /* clang-format on */ > > > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ > > > diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h > > > index 4eb643077a2a..2ef147389474 100644 > > > --- a/security/landlock/limits.h > > > +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h > > > @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ > > > #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) > > > #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) > > > -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP > > > +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP > > > #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1) > > > #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) > > > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c > > > index 669ba260342f..a29cb27c3f14 100644 > > > --- a/security/landlock/net.c > > > +++ b/security/landlock/net.c > > > @@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ > > > * Copyright © 2022-2023 Microsoft Corporation > > > */ > > > +#include "net/sock.h" > > > > These should not be quotes. > > will be fixed, thanks > > > > > > #include <linux/in.h> > > > #include <linux/net.h> > > > #include <linux/socket.h> > > > #include <net/ipv6.h> > > > +#include <net/tcp.h> > > > #include "common.h" > > > #include "cred.h" > > > @@ -194,9 +196,97 @@ static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock, > > > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); > > > } > > > +/* > > > + * Checks that socket state and attributes are correct for listen. > > > + * It is required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. > > > + * > > > + * This checker requires sock->sk to be locked. > > > + */ > > > +static int check_tcp_socket_can_listen(struct socket *const sock) > > > > Is this function still useful with the listen LSM hook? > > Yeap, we need to validate socket structure before checking the access > right. You can see [1] and [2] where the behavior of this function is > tested. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240728002602.3198398-6-ivanov.mikhail1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240728002602.3198398-8-ivanov.mikhail1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ OK, that's good. > > > > > > +{ > > > + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; > > > + unsigned char cur_sk_state = sk->sk_state; > > > + const struct tcp_ulp_ops *icsk_ulp_ops; > > > + > > > + /* Allows only unconnected TCP socket to listen (cf. inet_listen). */ > > > + if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED) > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * Checks sock state. This is needed to ensure consistency with inet stack > > > + * error handling (cf. __inet_listen_sk). > > > + */ > > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!((1 << cur_sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)))) > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > + > > > + icsk_ulp_ops = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ulp_ops; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * ULP (Upper Layer Protocol) stands for protocols which are higher than > > > + * transport protocol in OSI model. Linux has an infrastructure that > > > + * allows TCP sockets to support logic of some ULP (e.g. TLS ULP). > > > + * > > > + * Sockets can listen only if ULP control hook has clone method. > > > + */ > > > + if (icsk_ulp_ops && !icsk_ulp_ops->clone) > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > + return 0; > > > +} > > > + > > > +static int hook_socket_listen(struct socket *const sock, const int backlog) > > > +{ > > > > Why can't we just call current_check_access_socket()? > > I've mentioned in the message of the previous commit that this method > has address checks for bind(2) and connect(2). In the case of listen(2) > port is extracted from the socket structure, so calling > current_check_access_socket() would be pointless. Yep, I missed the check_access_socket() refactoring. > > > > > > + int err = 0; > > > + int family; > > > + __be16 port; > > > + struct sock *sk; > > > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain(); > > > + > > > + if (!dom) > > > + return 0; > > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) > > > + return -EACCES; > > > + > > > + /* Checks if it's a (potential) TCP socket. */ > > > + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) > > > + return 0; > > > + > > > + sk = sock->sk; > > > + family = sk->__sk_common.skc_family; > > > + /* > > > + * Socket cannot be assigned AF_UNSPEC because this type is used only > > > + * in the context of addresses. > > > + * > > > + * Doesn't restrict listening for non-TCP sockets. > > > + */ > > > + if (family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6) > > > + return 0; > > > + > > > + lock_sock(sk); > > > + /* > > > + * Calling listen(2) for a listening socket does nothing with its state and > > > + * only changes backlog value (cf. __inet_listen_sk). Checking of listen > > > + * access right is not required. > > > + */ > > > + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) > > > + goto release_nocheck; > > > + > > > + err = check_tcp_socket_can_listen(sock); > > > + if (unlikely(err)) > > > + goto release_nocheck; > > > + > > > + port = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num); > > > + release_sock(sk); > > > + return check_access_socket(dom, port, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP); > > > + > > > +release_nocheck: > > > + release_sock(sk); > > > + return err; > > > +} > > > + > > > static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), > > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), > > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, hook_socket_listen), > > > }; > > > __init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) > > > diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c > > > index 03b470f5a85a..3752bcc033d4 100644 > > > --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c > > > +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c > > > @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { > > > .write = fop_dummy_write, > > > }; > > > -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 5 > > > +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 6 > > > /** > > > * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset > > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c > > > index 3c1e9f35b531..52b00472a487 100644 > > > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c > > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c > > > @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version) > > > const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { > > > .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, > > > }; > > > - ASSERT_EQ(5, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, > > > + ASSERT_EQ(6, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, > > > LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); > > > ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0, > > > -- > > > 2.34.1 > > > > > > >
