Hello, On Tue, 16 Apr 2024, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote: > Let's make all IPVS sysctls visible and RO even when > network namespace is owned by non-initial user namespace. > > Let's make a few sysctls to be writable: > - conntrack > - conn_reuse_mode > - expire_nodest_conn > - expire_quiescent_template > > I'm trying to be conservative with this to prevent > introducing any security issues in there. Maybe, > we can allow more sysctls to be writable, but let's > do this on-demand and when we see real use-case. > > This list of sysctls was chosen because I can't > see any security risks allowing them and also > Kubernetes uses [2] these specific sysctls. > > This patch is motivated by user request in the LXC > project [1]. > > [1] https://github.com/lxc/lxc/issues/4278 > [2] https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/b722d017a34b300a2284b890448e5a605f21d01e/pkg/proxy/ipvs/proxier.go#L103 > > Cc: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@xxxxxx> > Cc: Simon Horman <horms@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@xxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c > index 143a341bbc0a..92a818c2f783 100644 > --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c > +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c > @@ -4285,10 +4285,22 @@ static int __net_init ip_vs_control_net_init_sysctl(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs) As the list of privileged vars is short I prefer to use a bool and to make only some vars read-only: bool unpriv = false; > if (tbl == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > > - /* Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users */ > + /* Let's show all sysctls in non-init user namespace-owned > + * net namespaces, but make them read-only. > + * > + * Allow only a few specific sysctls to be writable. > + */ > if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) { Here we should just set: unpriv = true; > - tbl[0].procname = NULL; > - ctl_table_size = 0; > + for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(vs_vars); idx++) { > + if (!tbl[idx].procname) > + continue; > + > + if (!((strcmp(tbl[idx].procname, "conntrack") == 0) || > + (strcmp(tbl[idx].procname, "conn_reuse_mode") == 0) || > + (strcmp(tbl[idx].procname, "expire_nodest_conn") == 0) || > + (strcmp(tbl[idx].procname, "expire_quiescent_template") == 0))) > + tbl[idx].mode = 0444; > + } > } > } else > tbl = vs_vars; And below at every place to use: if (unpriv) tbl[idx].mode = 0444; for the following 4 privileged sysctl vars: - sync_qlen_max: - allocates messages in kernel context - this needs better tunning in another patch - sync_sock_size: - allocates messages in kernel context - run_estimation: - for now, better init ns to decide if to use est stats - est_nice: - for now, better init ns to decide the value - debug_level: - already set to 0444 I.e. these vars allocate resources (mem, CPU) without proper control, so for now we will just copy them from init ns without allowing writing. And they are vars that are not tuned often. Also we do not know which netns is supposed to be the privileged one, some solutions move all devices out of init_net, so we can not decide where to use lower limits. OTOH, "amemthresh" is not privileged but needs single READ_ONCE for sysctl_amemthresh in update_defense_level() due to the possible div by zero if we allow writing to anyone, eg.: int amemthresh = max(READ_ONCE(ipvs->sysctl_amemthresh), 0); ... nomem = availmem < amemthresh; ... use only amemthresh All other vars can be writable. Regards -- Julian Anastasov <ja@xxxxxx>
