From: Jason Xing <kernelxing@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Supposing we set DNAT policy converting a_port to b_port on the
server at the beginning, the socket is set up by using 4-tuple:
client_ip:client_port <--> server_ip:b_port
Then, some strange skbs from client or gateway, say, out-of-window
skbs are eventually sent to the server_ip:a_port (not b_port)
in TCP layer due to netfilter clearing skb->_nfct value in
nf_conntrack_in() function. Why? Because the tcp_in_window()
considers the incoming skb as an invalid skb by returning
NFCT_TCP_INVALID.
At last, the TCP layer process the out-of-window
skb (client_ip,client_port,server_ip,a_port) and try to look up
such an socket in tcp_v4_rcv(), as we can see, it will fail for sure
because the port is a_port not our expected b_port and then send
back an RST to the client.
The detailed call graphs go like this:
1)
nf_conntrack_in()
-> nf_conntrack_handle_packet()
-> nf_conntrack_tcp_packet()
-> tcp_in_window() // tests if the skb is out-of-window
-> return -NF_ACCEPT;
-> skb->_nfct = 0; // if the above line returns a negative value
2)
tcp_v4_rcv()
-> __inet_lookup_skb() // fails, then jump to no_tcp_socket
-> tcp_v4_send_reset()
The moment the client receives the RST, it will drop. So the RST
skb doesn't hurt the client (maybe hurt some gateway which cancels
the session when filtering the RST without validating
the sequence because of performance reason). Well, it doesn't
matter. However, we can see many strange RST in flight.
The key reason why I wrote this patch is that I don't think
the behaviour is expected because the RFC 793 defines this
case:
"If the connection is in a synchronized state (ESTABLISHED,
FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT),
any unacceptable segment (out of window sequence number or
unacceptible acknowledgment number) must elicit only an empty
acknowledgment segment containing the current send-sequence number
and an acknowledgment..."
I think, even we have set DNAT policy, it would be better if the
whole process/behaviour adheres to the original TCP behaviour as
default.
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240307090732.56708-1-kerneljasonxing@xxxxxxxxx/
1. add one more test about NAT and then drop the skb (Florian)
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
index ae493599a3ef..19ddac526ea0 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
@@ -1256,10 +1256,21 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
case NFCT_TCP_IGNORE:
spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
return NF_ACCEPT;
- case NFCT_TCP_INVALID:
+ case NFCT_TCP_INVALID: {
+ int verdict = -NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK)
+ /* If DNAT is enabled and netfilter receives
+ * out-of-window skbs, we should drop it directly,
+ * or else skb would miss NAT transformation and
+ * trigger corresponding RST sending to the flow
+ * in TCP layer, which is not supposed to happen.
+ */
+ verdict = NF_DROP;
nf_tcp_handle_invalid(ct, dir, index, skb, state);
spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
- return -NF_ACCEPT;
+ return verdict;
+ }
case NFCT_TCP_ACCEPT:
break;
}
--
2.37.3
