From: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@xxxxxxxxx> Currently, in nft_flow_rule_create function, num_actions is a signed integer. Yet, it is processed within a loop which increments its value. To prevent an overflow from occurring, make it unsigned and also check if it reaches UINT_MAX when being incremented. After checking with maintainers, it was mentioned that front-end will cap the num_actions value and that it is not possible to reach such condition for an overflow. Yet, for correctness, it is still better to fix this. This issue was observed by the commit author while reviewing a write-up regarding a CVE within the same subsystem [1]. 1 - https://nickgregory.me/post/2022/03/12/cve-2022-25636/ Signed-off-by: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@xxxxxxxxx> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c index 12ab78fa5d84..d25088791a74 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ struct nft_flow_rule *nft_flow_rule_create(struct net *net, { struct nft_offload_ctx *ctx; struct nft_flow_rule *flow; - int num_actions = 0, err; + unsigned int num_actions = 0; + int err; struct nft_expr *expr; expr = nft_expr_first(rule); @@ -99,6 +100,9 @@ struct nft_flow_rule *nft_flow_rule_create(struct net *net, expr->ops->offload_action(expr)) num_actions++; + if (num_actions == UINT_MAX) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + expr = nft_expr_next(expr); } -- 2.42.0
