On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 11:33 AM Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@xxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thursday 2023-08-31 11:14, Ian Kumlien wrote: > > > >Anyway, it turns out that netfilter masq can leak internal information. > > > >It was fixed by doing: > >table inet filter { > >... > > chain forward { > > type filter hook forward priority 0 > > ct state invalid counter drop # <- this one > > > >It just seems odd to me that traffic can go through without being NAT:ed > > MASQ requires connection tracking; if tracking is disabled for a connection, > addresses cannot be changed. I don't disable connection tracking - this is most likely a expired session that is reused and IMHO it should just be added > >And since i thought it was quite bad to just drop internal traffic > > Now you know why drop policies are in place in every serious installation. I have never had to use this to prevent internal traffic from getting out in a non-nat:ed state. Not with ipfw, ipchains, iptables - I have never seen this behaviour before, not in 25 years..